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ABSTRACT 
For more than a half century, the United States government has been acquiring and 
launching satellites. However, throughout these years, there has been a shift in the space 
systems acquisitions model, from acquiring greater quantities but less complex satellites, 
to fewer quantities but drastically more complex individualized satellites. Within the past 
two decades, when a new satellite was to be built, whether as part of an existing 
generation of satellites or the first of its kind, it appeared that the acquisition process 
starts over from the beginning as if it was the first time building a satellite. This shift in 
the model has resulted in these individualized systems being extremely costly and taking 
a long time to be produced. The acquisition of the Defense Department’s Weather 
Satellites is one such example.  
This author asserts that effective systems acquisition requires a system 
engineering-inspired approach. The result of systems engineering guidance is to 
synthesize general principles from case studies. Therefore, this thesis researched the 
history of some Air Force Space acquisitions programs, current factors affecting the way 
systems are acquired, and new approaches (Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny [FIST], and 
Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency [EASE]) that are intended to remedy the 
aforementioned problems. In addition, Toyota’s process for producing new vehicles 
models was also reviewed. These three approaches were then applied to the Defense 
Department’s Weather Satellite program to develop recommendations for its follow-on 
program’s acquisition strategy.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
For more than a half century the United States government has been acquiring and 
launching satellites. However, throughout these years there has been a shift in the space 
systems acquisitions model, from acquiring greater quantities but less complex and 
smaller satellites, to fewer quantities but drastically more complex and larger 
individualized satellites. In addition, within the past two decades, when a new satellite 
was to be built, whether as part of an existing generation of satellites or the first of its 
kind, it appears that the acquisition process starts over from the beginning as if it was the 
first time building a satellite. This shift in the model and apparent lack of reuse of 
technology has resulted in these individualized systems being extremely costly and taking 
a long time to be produced. The acquisition of the Defense Department’s Weather 
Satellites is one such example that has seen this pendulum swing, and the DoD is taking 
steps to get it under control. 
This author asserts that effective systems acquisition requires a system 
engineering inspired approach. Result of systems engineering guidance is to synthesize 
general principles from case studies. Therefore, this thesis researched the history of the 
DMSP, MILSATCOM, and GPS Space acquisitions programs, current factors affecting 
the way systems are acquired, and new approaches, Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny 
(FIST), and Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE), that are intended to 
remedy the aforementioned problems. In addition, Toyota’s process for producing new 
vehicles models was also reviewed, specifically the 14 principles of the Toyota Way 
because of similarities between the automotive industry and space systems acquisitions.   
These three approaches were then applied to the Defense Department’s Weather 
Satellite program to develop recommendations for its follow-on program’s acquisition 
strategy to meet the program’s need as it is currently understood. Essentially, the main 
aspects of the recommendation were to follow a block acquisition approach with the 
procurement of two satellites at a time, similar to what is being done for AEHF 5 and 6 
and utilize Fixed Price Incentive Firm contracts for the majority of the acquisition. 
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For more than half a century, the U.S. government has been acquiring, launching, 
and learning important lessons about Satellite acquisitions, yet it appears that lessons 
learned earlier do not necessarily propagate throughout later years, leading one to ask if 
we constantly have to relive and relearn lessons of the past versus capitalizing on them 
and moving forward. In particular, “over the past two decades, DoD has had difficulties 
with nearly every space acquisition program, with years of cost and schedule growth, 
technical and design problems, and oversight and management weaknesses” (GAO, 2011, 
May). 
The current model of Space Systems acquisition has the taxpayer paying for 
fewer, drastically more complex space systems that are extremely costly and takes a 
significantly long time to become operational (GAO, 2011, May), as shown in Figure 6. 
These systems are often very individualized and do not share many similarities with other 
systems. In addition, systems acquisition normally relies on significant research and 
development, a stage that does not have adequate technology maturation, which has led 
to programs costing significantly more and taking a long time to be fielded. On the other 
hand, compare that approach to an acquisition model where simpler, less capable 
systems, greater quantities, are acquired and as time evolve and technology matures, 
capabilities are gradually increased and delivered to the Warfighter. This latter approach 
would almost certainly allow systems to be fielded faster and with a greater probability of 
meeting the program’s Cost, Schedule, and Performance (CSP) objectives. If there are 
failures, having more systems available would better enable sustainment of greater losses 
versus systems that contain fewer, more complex individualized units, based on the 
principles of the division of risk.   
As some of DoD’s space systems approach their end of life, their follow-on 
programs have experienced significant problems with meeting performance requirements, 
schedule, cost, and are in jeopardy of being cancelled. In fact, the Transformational 
 2 
Satellite Communication System (TSAT) program was cancelled in 2009, likewise the 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program 
in 2010 and its initial successor, the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) in 2012. 
While Warfighters are depending on these capabilities being available, they are becoming 
increasingly unaffordable and taking longer to be fielded. It is plausible that if strong 
systems engineering, forward-looking practices were used during their initial designs, and 
during transition to systems with greater capabilities, there would be fewer obstacles to 
overcome as transition is made from one generation of satellites to the next. For example, 
the Defense Metrological Satellite Program (DMSP), DoD’s sole weather satellite 
program has successfully served the nation for over 50 years and was preparing to end 
after the last two satellites in the current acquisition block are launched. DMSP yet again 
has been extended because its initial successor, NPOESS, a merger between DoD 
weather and Civilian Weather, had experienced significant CSP difficulties to the extent 
that the government decided to separate NPOESS back into two programs (GAO, 2010, 
May). DoD’s piece, initially called DWSS, was similarly cancelled within less than one 
year of being in existence. Congress expressed concerns that DWSS was “not on a sound 
acquisition footing, despite the restructure of the program….The Committee does not 
want to repeat the costly mistakes of the NPOESS program with DWSS. Therefore, the 
Committee recommends the termination of the DWSS program” (Senate, 2011). These 
cancellations have resulted in DMSP’s last two satellites further being heavily relied on 
to perform beyond their original design life so as to bridge any potential weather 
coverage gap until DMSP’s follow-on program, become operational. It is important to 
note that these satellites were built during the late 1990s and will be approximately 20 
years old by the time they are launched. In fact, the last satellite (Flight 20) was once 
thought not to be needed and to be placed in a museum, is now the key to preventing a 
potential weather coverage gap between the current block of DMSP satellites and the 
follow-on program’s satellites.   
The current DMSP satellites were procured in “batches,” also known as a block 
acquisition approach, with minor upgrades made throughout the program’s duration to 
address parts degradation and some obsolescence issues. This combined approach created 
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program stability and is directly attributed to the current program’s success because there 
was not frequent starting and stopping of production lines (Tobias, 2011). However, 
simultaneously this approach has contributed to NPOESS’ dilemma because sufficient 
early resources were not allocated to solving new technological challenges that follow-on 
programs experience. Three approaches discussed in Chapter III contain provisions to 
solve this dilemma.   
“Current Air Force procurement practices have led to increased cost due to 
production line breaks, parts obsolescence and inefficient use of labor” (Tobias, 2011). 
The aforementioned challenges such as parts obsolescence, slow technological 
maturation, starting and stopping of production lines are not only unique to Space 
Acquisitions but experienced in other industries such as the automotive industry. While 
automobiles are produced in mass quantities unlike satellites, automobiles do follow a 
similar block acquisition approach and may have best practices that can be adopted and 
applied to the acquisitions of space systems. For this reason, Toyota’s approach to 
updating and acquiring new models will be investigated; particularly the 14 Toyota Way 
Principles according to Jeffrey Liker, co-founder of the Japan Technology Management 
Program at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to recognize there may be a better way for the Air 
Force to procure satellites than the current model. That way could be smaller, less 
capable systems that are faster to build and then gradually increase the capabilities once 
technology matures. This thesis will evaluate the model that is used to acquire Space 
systems, new approaches to improve acquisitions such as, Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, 
Tiny (FIST), Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE) to be implemented 
in fiscal year 2012 (GAO, 2011, May), and the 14 Principles of the Toyota Way, and 
apply these three approaches to the Defense Department’ Weather Satellite program. 
Thereby, outlining a program that theoretically should cost less, take less time to field, 
and provide the warfighter with the desired scope of functionality and performance 
(Tobias, 2011).   
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While the purpose of this thesis is geared toward recommendations for what the 
Defense Department’ should do for its follow-on Weather Satellite program acquisition 
strategy, information learned should also be transferable to other space acquisition 
programs because they all operate in the same domain and experience similar challenges. 
Implementing these recommendations should minimize the inadvertent challenges, such 
as technological immaturity that delays new programs and thereby should reduce the cost 
and time it takes to bring new programs to realization, while ensuring that the warfighter 
is able to take advantage of newer needed technologies once they become available, are 
proven, and have desired characteristics.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to answer the following questions:     
1. What are some of the acquisition challenges facing current Space systems? 
2. What acquisition approach is best suited for Space systems? Single Step, 
Incremental/Block, Spiral, or a combination?  
3. What is a possible solution for the DMSP follow-on program if FIST, EASE, 
and Toyota’s approaches were used to help define it?  
4. What lessons, if any, can Space System acquisition leverage from other 
acquisition approaches such as those used in the automotive industry?  
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis will provide a basis of knowledge that can be leveraged by space 
systems acquisition professionals, in particular, program managers and system engineers; 
which will in turn improve the space systems acquisition cycle, cost and time it takes to 
get new capabilities to the Warfighter. It should be insightful to the program office with 
the responsibility for the DMSP follow-on program’s acquisition, as they seek to design 
and implement an executable program solution. 
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E. SCOPE  
This thesis will focus on the systems acquisition approaches used on the various 
current and follow-on DMSP, Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM), and 
Global Positioning System (GPS) programs and compare them to the Toyota Way of 
producing new and upgraded vehicle models. Specific attention will also be given to the 
DMSP satellites which should form the basis for the follow-on program. Much of the 
analysis will be dependent on research and content analysis.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Conduct a literature review of DMSP, MILSATCOM, and GPS program 
documents. 
2. Research and describe various proposed methods to improve acquisitions as 
applied to Space Systems such as, Fast Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny (FIST), and 
Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE).  
3. Review and summarize the goals and objectives for the DMSP follow-on 
program. 
4. Review applicable cases from the automotive industry, paying particular 
attention to Toyota’s way of improving its automobiles. 
5. Use the principles of FIST, EASE, and the Toyota Way to develop 
recommendations for improving space systems acquisitions, specifically for 
the DMSP follow-on program.  
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter II contains 
a literature review of the acquisitions framework being used to acquire space systems. 
This acquisition framework review is required so that informed recommendations can be 
made in Chapter V, for what the DoD should do for its follow-on Weather Satellite 
program. To effectively generate recommendations, reviews of the history of space 
acquisitions and key factors that influences today’s space systems acquisitions are 
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required so the reader gains the understanding of the current era under which decisions 
are made for the new system to be acquired. Equally, it is important to understand the 
history of the current program, what satellites have been acquired throughout the years 
and what are the issues facing the current and proposed follow-on programs. This type of 
in-depth literature review of the DMSP program will also be conducted in Chapter II. In 
addition, the literature review would not be complete if other similar systems were not 
reviewed so as to gain an understanding of what has been done, currently being done, and 
proposed to be done for future similar programs. So, the MILSATCOM and GPS systems 
will also be reviewed. Together, information learned in the literature review will become 
a basis for the recommendations in Chapter V. When problems are posed that defy 
thinking “linearly,” systems engineering suggests and the author believes it is also 
important to “think outside the box.”  Reviewing what is being done in other industries, 
such as the automotive industry which faces similar challenges, may offer insight into 
solutions not yet considered. So, Chapter II ends with a review of Toyota’s approach, 
paying particular attention to the 14 Toyota Way Principles.   Chapter III will introduce 
two recent DoD initiatives, FIST and EASE, to improve acquisitions and will focus on 
their application to space systems acquisitions. It also includes discussions about how the 
Toyota Way principles are applicable to space acquisitions. Chapter IV merges the 
information in Chapters II and III and analyzes them. It begins with a mapping of the 
relevant aspects of the three approaches, showing a comparison and connections among 
them. Next, a summary of where things currently stand with the DMSP follow-on 
program was made, and then applicable aspects of FIST, EASE, and Toyota’s principles 
were applied to generate a possible strategy for the DMSP follow-on program. Chapter V 
brings the thesis to a close, restating the research questions, summarizing their answers, 
then wraps up with a conclusion, recommendations and identifies areas to conduct further 
research. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, Chapter I introduced the problem by identifying the most important 
issues currently affecting space acquisitions and then posing key questions whose 
answers help suggest solutions. The DoD Weather program was used as an example to 
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illustrate the points that were discussed. Specifically, how DoD’s space systems are 
extremely costly, to the point of some being unaffordable and cancelled, and take a long 
time to become operational. Next, the purpose of this thesis was stated and why it is 
important. It is recognized that there may be a better way for the Air Force to procure 
satellites than the current model, such going back to smaller, less capable systems that are 
faster to build and then gradually increase the capabilities once technology matures. Two 
Air Force acquisition improvement initiatives, FIST and EASE, were first introduced 
along with the Toyota Way 14 principles. Research questions then followed, which 
guided the research work; obtaining answers to these questions resulted in answering the 
main thesis problem. After which, the benefits of this study were outlined and its linkage 
to the DMSP follow-on program office. Particularly, how this thesis will provide a basis 
of knowledge that space systems acquisition professionals can leverage so as to improve 
their acquisitions of space systems. The scope was then explained, looking at satellite 
programs such as DMSP, MILSATCOM, and GPS, and non-satellite systems such as the 
automotive industry, specifically, the Toyota Way. The methodology followed, outlining 
seven steps that were used to accomplish this thesis. And finally, this chapter ended with 
a chapter by chapter outline of how the thesis is organized. 
 8 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To appreciate the issues being addressed in this thesis, it is important to first 
review the framework being used to acquire DoD space systems. Having a basic 
understanding of the history of space acquisitions, together with current significant 
influences, provide clarity to some of the aforementioned issues that affect space 
acquisitions today. These two items are covered in Section B of this chapter. Since this 
thesis will research the current model that is used to acquire space systems and 
recommend a proposed solution for the DMSP follow-on program, it is important to do a 
detailed examination of the existing DMSP program and a summary level review of other 
similar programs such as MILSATCOM and GPS so as to understand what historically 
has been done in the space community and planned for the future. These reviews are 
covered in sections C, D, and E of this chapter, which will form a baseline for the 
recommendations in Chapter V. The purpose of the chronological history is to show how 
the programs have evolved to where they are today and to see if lessons from the past can 
be used to help make better decisions for the future. 
However, because some issues affecting space acquisitions, such as technology 
refresh, are not only unique to space but can also be found in other industries, it is equally 
important to conduct research in these non-space acquisition areas to find best practices 
or lessons learned that may be applicable to space systems acquisitions. For example, the 
automotive industry is uniquely comparable to space acquisitions because they both deal 
with emerging technologies. This author posits that an equivalent review provides a basic 
understanding of what that industry does to deal with similar problems. This is premised 
on the following similarities of like-kind situations in different industries going through 
similar processes of system design, development, build, and test. The particular interest to 
this research is how well these similarities can extend to the production lines. Both 
experience parts manufacturer issues and function in cost constrained environments. The 
dissimilarities such as quantities produced and one being government versus the other is 
in the private sector are not significant because it is the similarities in the processes that 
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are used to generate the quantities that are important. At the end of the day, both answer 
to someone, the taxpayer and the shareholder, respectively. Even though the feedback 
loops with the taxpayers and shareholders are wildly different (years versus months), the 
ever present fiduciary duty persists in all decisions. Therefore, this chapter ends with a 
review of Toyota’s approach to creating new models and updating existing models. 
B. SPACE SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS FRAMEWORK 
The current Air Force space management structure was directed by the 
Secretary of Defense in 2002 and 2003 in response to findings from the 
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization (commonly referred to as the Space 
Commission). In that reorganization, the Secretary of the Air Force was 
designated as the Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agent for 
Space with centralized responsibilities for Air Force and DoD space 
management.  (Department of The Air Force, 2010, p. 4) 
The Air Force has been designated as the Executive Agent for Space for DoD 
with the responsibility for acquiring the vast majority of space assets. As a means to 
improve cost, schedule, and performance, the literature review focused on the acquisition 
process for space systems the Air Force had and is responsible for acquiring.  
Several factors affect the Space Systems Acquisition framework but currently the 
most significant one is cost, as conveyed in a 2010 “Memorandum for Acquisition 
Professionals” from Dr. Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense, titled: “Better 
Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense 
Spending.”  In this memo, he “give[s] direction…[for] delivering better value to the 
taxpayer and improving the way the Department does business.”    
Dr. Carter laid out “an initial framework for restoring affordability to defense” 
(Under Secretary of Defense [AT&L], 2010), as seen in Figures 1 through 3. Figure 1 
highlight “Objectives” of the new acquisition framework that Dr. Carter wants 





framework should result in the DoD being more efficient. The goals of this thesis in 
conjunction with the FIST and EASE initiatives, which are outlined in Chapters III 
and IV, support Dr. Carter’s objectives.  
 
Figure 1.   Initial Framework for Restoring Affordability to Defense  
(From Under Secretary of Defense [AT&L], 2010, p. 4) 
Figure 2 shows a list of incentives that, according to Dr, Carter, if implemented 
appropriately, should drive industry to greater efficiency thereby lowering acquisition 
costs. The second item “Using Proper Contract Type For Development and 
Procurement,” is the third tenet of the EASE process that will be discussed in Chapter III.   
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Figure 2.   Initial Framework for Restoring Affordability to Defense  (From Under Secretary of Defense [AT&L], 2010, p. 5) 
 13 
Figure 3 shows Dr. Carter’s eight steps for “Adopting Government Practices that 
Encourage Efficiency.”  While all of them deal with some aspect of efficiency, it is 
particularly important to highlight one of them: “MANDATING AFFORDABILITY AS 
A REQUIREMENT: In new programs…cost considerations must shape requirements and 
design” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2010). By making this mandate, it 
reinforces the notion that cost is currently the key influence to Acquisitions today, which 
dovetails nicely with the purpose of this thesis.  
 
Figure 3.   Initial Framework for Restoring Affordability to Defense  
(From Under Secretary of Defense [AT&L], 2010, p. 6) 
1. Space Acquisition History 
The launch of Sputnik in October 1957, combined with continued test 
failures in the Viking Launch Vehicle, drove the DoD to focus on 
developing more reliable and technologically sophisticated space launch 
systems. In November 1957, the DoD authorized the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency (ABMA) to launch a satellite using its ABMA Jupiter 
rocket. This marked the first successful U.S. satellite launch, earning the 
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U.S. Army the right to claim that it was ‘the first in space’ among the 
agencies of the U.S. government. Although the U.S. Army continued to 
conduct research on space-related technologies between 1958–1975, other 
conflicting initiatives, policy developments and the impact of the Vietnam 
War constrained its space programs. (Boehm, n.d.) 
While the Army can claim to be the “first in space,” according to the Space and 
Missile Systems Center (SMC) fact sheet, 2010, the Air Force’s space acquisition, as it is 
known today, began in July 1954 at the Western Development Division (WDD) of the 
Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), the precursor to the Space and 
Missile Systems Center. Their initial priority was to develop Inter Continental Ballistic 
Missiles. In 1955, ARDC added military satellite system development to WDD’s original 
mission.  
Starting with the first military satellite program, a reconnaissance concept 
known as Weapon System 117L, WDD and its successors developed 
progressively more capable satellite systems in four primary mission 
areas: surveillance, communications, meteorology, and navigation. (SMC, 
2010) 
Currently, “some of the more recent operational systems performing these 
missions are the Defense Support Program infrared missile surveillance system, the 
Defense Satellite Communications System and Milstar communications systems, the 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Programs (DMSP)…and the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) navigation system” (SMC, 2010). The latter three are discussed later in this 
chapter and throughout this thesis. 
Acquisitions today have become a very requirements-driven process as evident 
from the previous discussions on “affordability”—i.e., cost—now mandated as a 
requirement. Essentially it is no longer a trade-off factor with schedule and performance, 
so basically it is a constant and only schedule and performance are allowed to change. 
However, in 1957, at the beginning of the space race, schedule was paramount, 
performance needed to be acceptable, and the cost had to be reasonable. But, it was a 
race. As the space effort matured around simple physical structures, technology 
advancements afforded us the opportunity to increase technical performances, but cost 
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and schedule were its victims. Now we have sacrificed cost and schedule for 
performance. This is evident from Dr. Pedro Rustan’s 2005 testimony to a House Armed 
Services Committee Hearing: 
During the first 30 years of the space program, we built capability-driven 
systems that provided the best that our advanced technologies could offer. 
That strategy worked well in offering innovative solutions, but it did not 
always represent the customer’s needs. During the last 15 years, however, 
we have swung the pendulum to the other extreme by collecting overly 
broad requirements sets that our space systems should meet. This strict 
requirements-driven process often includes mutually exclusive capabilities 
that cannot be easily integrated on the same spacecraft. When we attempt 
to do so, it can drive significant increases in cost and schedule. Our 
requirements driven stakeholders often do not understand the cost 
implications of the various elements of their respective wish lists, and 
when we proceed to blindly integrate these capabilities, considerable 
problems develop. This problem is exacerbated when we are asked to hold 
fixed performance, cost and schedule at the beginning of any space 
acquisitions, thereby inexorably increasing program risk. (Space 
Acquisitions, 2005) 
Figure 4 shows an illustration of the program management pendulum swing that 
Dr. Rustan talked about. While it shows the years from 1957 to 2005, the date of Dr. 
Rustan’s testimony, between 2005 and today, essentially all of the issues still remain but 
the priority has changed with cost being the most important.          
 
Figure 4.   Program Management Pendulum Swing (From Space Acquisitions, 2005) 
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As shown in Figure 4, the general culture of acquiring Space systems has changed 
over the years. For example, risk tolerance has drastically been reduced; it has changed 
from being actively managed to one of risk aversion. While not ideal, during the initial 
years of space acquisition, it was tolerable when some systems failed because that 
normally resulted in more knowledge being gained, cheaper and hence affordable 
systems, faster acquisition of systems, and data reaching the Warfigher. However, since 
decision makers have become very risk adverse, significant amount of money is spent to 
prevent failures, commonly referred to as “mission assurance.”  To accomplish this, 
several redundancies for various system components are built into the systems. To 
compound the affordability problem, spacecrafts have grown in size to accommodate 
more instruments because of increased requirements. This change has resulted in 
significant complexities, such as integration, which further exaggerates the costs and 
schedule it takes for satellites to be built, launched, and become operational.  
So, in the end, the tax-payer now pays for large, individualized, more complex 
systems that take a very long time to be acquired and at a significantly greater cost than 
what is affordable. While one may justify this previous approach because of the high 
costs to launch satellites into orbit, there needs to be a balance between the two. This 
balance is what DoD has struggled with throughout the years. These issues are 
summarized in the following excerpt from Secretary Gates’ speech.  
The perennial procurement and contracting cycle—going back many 
decades—of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer 
and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an 
end. There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting 
reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. 
Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action. 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2009) 
In her May 2011 testimony before the subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
Committee on Armed Services, and the U.S. Senate, Christina T. Chaplain, Director of 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
summarized the events of the last 20 years of space acquisitions as follows: 
Each year DoD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based 
capabilities to support current military and other government operations, 
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as well as to enable DoD to transform the way it collects and disseminates 
information. Despite the significant investment in space, the majority of 
large-scale acquisition programs in DoD’s space portfolio have 
experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up 
costs by hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars, stretched 
schedules by years, and increased technical risks. To address the cost 
increases, DoD altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites 
it intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or terminating 
major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the cost increases, 
many space acquisitions have experienced significant schedule delays—of 
as much as 9 years—resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as 
missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These 
problems persist; however, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense have taken a wide range of actions to prevent them from 
occurring in new programs.  (GAO, 2011, May, p.1) 
Systems inherently cost significantly more than their initial estimates and thus 
making other systems unaffordable due to the limited budget available. The issues GAO 
identified above and their study of seven current satellite programs revealed that “the 
cumulative costs for the major space acquisition programs have increased by about 
$13.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2010 through 2015, almost a 
286 percent increase” (GAO, 2011, May). Figure 5 shows the seven space programs that 
the GAO studied for this report. It is important to highlight that in three cases, additional 
satellites were procured than what were originally intended. The reason for the additional 
AEHF satellite was because of the cancellation of the TSAT program. It is also important 
to highlight that Figure 5 does not include the “most recent estimate” for the restructured 
NPOESS program because at the time of that GAO study, it was not an official program 
of record. The DWSS program, to be discussed in this thesis, was one aspect of the 







Figure 5.   Differences in Total Costs from Program Start to Most Recent Estimates  
(From GAO, 2011, May, p. 6) 
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The Warfighter needs these capabilities faster due to legacy systems failing, the 
enemy being more agile, adapting faster, and thus a changing threat. However, space 
systems are taking longer to become operational. All seven major systems acquisition 
programs GAO studied are years behind schedule and the estimated additional time 
needed for many of them to launch their first satellites are significant, as seen in Figure 6.  
Figure 6.   Total Number of Estimated or Actual Months from Program Start to  
Initial Launch (From GAO, 2011, May, p. 7) 
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2. Key Influences of Today’s Space Systems Acquisitions 
Foil (2009) researched and listed 16 initiatives that were geared toward improving 
acquisitions of major weapon systems, each of which has influenced Acquisitions as it is 
known today. Table 1 shows the summary of these initiatives and their respective dates; 
now a 17th, “Better Buying Power,” can be added for year 2010 as previously mentioned 
and conveyed in Dr. Carter’s memo. So, while there are several factors that influence 
Space Systems Acquisition, currently the most significant one is cost.   
Table 1.   Acquisition Improvement Initiatives (From Foil, 2009, p. 20) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, “MANDATING AFFORDABILITY AS A 
REQUIREMENT: In new programs…cost considerations must shape requirements and 
design” is one of the eight mandates under the title “Adopting Government Practices that 
Encourage Efficiency.”  By mandating this requirement, it reinforces DoD’s focus on 
cost as currently having the single most influence on Acquisitions. Also shown in Figure 
3, Initial Framework for Restoring Affordability to Defense, is the requirement for 
“STABILIZING PRODUCTION RATES: To ensure more programs are in stable, 
economically favorable rates of production and avoid cost escalation, program managers 
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may not adjust production rates downward without head of component authority” (Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L) 2010). Together, these two mandates will significantly 
influence the way how systems are acquired now and into the future.  
GAO (2011) highlighted the following influences to Space Acquisitions that 
resulted in cost growth and related problems:  
First, on a broad scale, DoD has tended to start more weapon programs 
than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low 
cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad 
news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and 
assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on 
advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, 
with too much programs in its portfolio, DoD is forced to continually shift 
funds to and from programs-particularly as programs experience problems 
that require additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn, 
have had costly reverberating effects. Second, DoD has tended to start its 
space programs too early…before it has the assurance that the capabilities 
it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time 
constraints….Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all 
requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or the 
maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DoD 
has preferred to make fewer but heavier, large, and more complex 
satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather than larger 
constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually increase in 
sophistication.  (GAO, 2011, May, pp. 17–18) 
Another issue that the GAO found is that there is no set process for transferring 
Science and Technology from research laboratories to program offices. This has created a 
problem for program managers to know when technologies are ready to be transferred 
into acquisition programs (GAO, 2011, Jul). Figure 7 shows various factors that can 
break acquisitions and thus are key influences to today’s Space Systems acquisitions.  
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Figure 7.   Key Underlying Problems that Can Break Acquisitions  
(From GAO, 2011, p.18) 
In 2010, after Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, directed a review of 
Air Force Headquarter Management of Space responsibilities, he issued an Air Force 
directive that would implement several findings based on that review. This directive 
contained nine actions that will influence the way Space systems are acquired via a more 
streamlined and effective way. The nine crucial actions are listed below: 
1) The Under Secretary of the Air Force will serve as the focal point for 
space within the Air Force Headquarters and be responsible for 
coordinating the functions and activities across the Air Force space 
enterprise….2)  The position of Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force 
for Space will be retained and re-designated as SAF/SP. SAF/SP will 
report to the Under Secretary and will direct the headquarters staff 
responsible for space policy, issue integration, and strategy….3)  The 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs 
(SAF/IA) will continue in their role as the office of primary responsibility 
for AF international space matters….4)  The Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) will serve as the single Service 
Acquisition Executive (SAE) for the Air Force with responsibilities 
covering all Air Force acquisitions (space and non-space). The Air Force 
Program Executive Officer (AFPEO) for Space will report to SAF/AQ for 
space acquisition matters, in accordance with statutory and DoD direction. 
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The supporting HAF acquisition staff for space (now SAF/USA), will be 
realigned under SAF/AQ and redesignated as SAF/AQS. These actions 
consolidate all Air Force acquisition functions in one office, streamlining 
the structure….5)  Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) will continue to 
execute duties as the Air Force’s Lead Command for space related 
capabilities, to include such major functions as: developing and 
coordinating space system requirements, overseeing daily space 
operations; and planning/programming for AF space programs….6)  The 
Deputy Chief of staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5) 
maintains its role as the principal Air Staff organization for space 
operations and requirements….7)  Create an Air Force Space Board as the 
governance mechanism to coordinate Air Force positions regarding multi-
organization, service, and inter-agency issues….8)  Realign those 
manpower billet in the NSSO that were within the Air Force to 
SAF/SP….9)  Discuss with Air Force leaders, OSD space leaders, and the 
Congress the optimal reporting structure for the Operationally Responsive 
Space (ORS) office going forward.  (Secretary of the Air Force, 2010, pp. 
2–3) 
 
In addition to the aforementioned management and oversight changes made by 
the Secretary of the Air Force, in 2011 the GAO highlighted eight categories of actions 
that the DoD has implemented or is in the process of implementing, that will affect Space 
Systems Acquisitions. The third in the list of eight categories is a summary of the 
aforementioned “Management and Oversight,” contained in the Air Force directive from 




Table 2.   Actions Taken or Being Taken That Could Benefit Space Acquisition  
Outcomes (From GAO, 2011, May, pp. 20–21)  
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Table 3.   Actions Taken or Being Taken That Could Benefit Space Acquisition  
Outcomes–Continuation of Table 2 (From GAO, 2011, May, pp. 20–21)   
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C. THE DMSP PROGRAM 
The DMSP program is the DoD’s sole weather satellite program whose “mission 
is to generate terrestrial and space weather data for operational forces worldwide….The 
data from this program is also furnished to the civilian community through the 
Department of Commerce” (DMSP fact sheet, 2009). This program began as a temporary 
top secret classified program in the early 1960s to enable “[s]uccessful operation of 
overhead photoreconnaissance satellites…[which] depended on accurate and timely 
meteorological forecasts of the Sino-Soviet landmass” (Hall, 2001). Because of the 
purpose of this program and sensitivity at the time, “[t]his program, needless to say, had a 
succession of numeric and alphabetic names, including Program II, P-35, 698BH, 417, 
and Defense Systems Applications Program (DSAP)” (Hall, 2001). Today it remains vital 
to providing various types of global weather information to the Warfigher.   
The initial spacecrafts identified as “the P35 series were grouped in generations 
known as “Blocks.”  Blocks 1 and 2 must be considered as experimental satellites. RCA 
manufactured the spacecraft of Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4A and 4B” (NOAA, 2008). Each 
successive block built on information from the previous block. Block 1 acquisitions 
began as a temporary program “for four ‘earth-referenced’ weather satellites” on June 21, 
1961 with “a plan for a 22-month program, one that specified a small fixed budget and a 
first launch in ten months” (Hall, 2001). They were regarded as “a single purpose, 
minimum cost, ‘high-risk program’. Smaller and lighter than the original TIROS, the 
100-pound TIROS-derived RCA satellite was shaped like a 10-sided polyhedron,  
23-inches across and 21-inches high” (Hall, 2001). Its first launch on 23 May 1962 ended 
in launch failure after the Scout booster second stage exploded. There were a total of 
eleven spacecrafts launched in this Block. Because of booster issues, four failed to reach 
orbit, one was placed in an elliptical orbit. Two launches contained two satellites each. 
Details are shown in Table 4. Note: there are inconsistencies in information from the 
various literature reviews, such as launch dates, binning satellites into the appropriate 
blocks, etc. When such situations arose, the information used in this thesis was found in 
multiple sources. 
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Table 4.   DMSP Block 1 Satellites and Boosters (After Hall, 2001; Shaltanis, 2000, Heyman 2007, Bohlson 2007) 
Initial Program – Block 1 











F-1 Vidicon Scout 
23 May 
62 - N/A 0 Booster failure 
Blk1–2 
F-2 Vidicon Scout 
23 Aug 
62 11 Jun 63 UNK 
290 











Elliptical Orbit due to poor 3rd stage 
performance, tape recorder & vidicon 
failure; satellite decom since spin was 














Scout 27 Sep 63 - N/A 0 Booster failure 
Blk1–6 & 
Blk1–7 








10 Jul 64 & 









Both launched together, Blk 1–7 out 
lasted Blk1–6; decommissioned b/c spin 
rate too low to operate 
Blk1–8 & 
Blk1–9 








16 Feb 66 
& 















65 - N/A 0 










65 15 Jun 65 UNK 85 
Launched noontime modified for direct 
readout to support operations in 
Southeast Asia 
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In 1964, three Block 2 satellites were produced from NRO’s approval for 
modification of three Block 1 satellites. They were “160-pound vehicles, identical in size 
and shape to their 100-to-120 pound Block 1 predecessors, also mounted improved 
infrared radiometers” (Hall, 2001). In fact, launched before the Block 2 satellites, a 
“fourth satellite, the one equipped and launched expressly for tactical uses on 20 May 
1965, came to be called Block 3. The reason for this curiosity, a ‘one-vehicle block,’ 
involved efforts to distinguish it from its Block 2 cousins that also supported the primary 
strategic mission for the NRP” (Hall, 2001). 
 Even before the first Block 2 satellite was launched in 1965, and just prior to 
stepping down as the DMSP first director, “Colonel Haig secured permission to begin the 
design of a more powerful military meteorological satellite that met more completely the 
demands of its customers. The Block 4 satellite[s], slightly larger than those in Blocks 1 
and 2, was 30 inches in diameter, 29 inches high, and weighed 175 pounds” (Hall, 2001).  
These satellites were a significant improvement over Blocks 1, 2, & 3 which had a 
single 1/2-inch focal length RCA vidicon television camera … furnished a 
nadir resolution of 3-to-4 nautical miles (nm) over an 800-nm swath, with 
significant gaps in coverage of the Earth at the equator. Block 4 vehicles 
carried two one-inch focal length vidicons canted at 26 degrees from the 
vertical that provided global coverage of the Earth (contiguous coverage at 
the equator), along a 1,500-nm swath. The resolution varied from 0.8 nm 
at the nadir to 3 nm at the picture’s edge. Besides a multi-sensor infrared 
subsystem, Block 4 also incorporated a high-resolution radiometer [HHR] 
that furnished cloud-height profiles. A tape recorder of increased capacity 
stored pictures of the entire northern hemisphere each day, while the 
satellite furnished realtime, direct local tactical weather coverage to small 
mobile ground or shipboard terminals. (Hall, 2001) 
A total of eight Block 4 satellites were built and seven were launched. Table 5 shows a 
summary of the progression from Block 2 through Block 4. As with Table 4, literature 
review had conflicting information for some “Launch” and “End of Primary Mission” 
dates. In the case of launch dates, they were off by one day. The earlier dates were used 
in the table to represent the date at the launch site. These launches were at night from the 
pacific coast and could account for the one day discrepancy in launch dates. In addition, 
decommission dates were not readily available for these earlier Satellites.   
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Table 5.   DMSP Blocks 2 thru 4 Satellites and Boosters (After Hall, 2001; Shaltanis, 2000; Heyman, 2007; Bohlson, 2007) 
Block 2 
 




Decom. Mission life (days) Notes 
Blk2–1 
F-13 




Burner I 9 Sep 65 17 Aug 66  
22 Sep 
66 341 











66 30 Mar 68 UNK 730 
Recorder failure, C System 
degraded, Camera failed 
Feb 68 
                                                                            Block 3 
Blk3–1 




65 16 Feb 67 UNK 637 
Launched expressly for 
tactical uses & before 
Block 2 satellites 
Blocks 4: A & B 
 
Blk4A-1 








F-17 Video, C 
Thor/ 
Burner II 8 Feb 67 18 May 67 UNK 99 
In Noon Orbit, Video 
System Failures 
Blk4A-3 












67 26 Mar 68 
23 Jun 
68 167 
In Noon Orbit, Cameras & 
Recorder Failure 
Blk4B-1 




68 11 Sep 68 
26 May 
69 112 
Recorder, C System 
Failures 
Blk4B-2 




68 19 Sep 70 UNK 697 Recorder Failed 
Blk4B-3 
F-22 Video, C, H 
Thor/ 
Burner II 22 Jul 69 19 Mar 71 UNK 604 Recorder Failed 
Blk4B-4 
F-23 Video, C Never Launched, donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry 
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 Concurrently, as Block 4 satellites were being delivered and launched under the 
guidance of the new program director, Major John Kulpa, he began work on the next 
series of satellites, Block 5, and used a different acquisition approach as explained below.   
[T]he revolutionary Block 5 spacecraft that resulted from the efforts of 
Geer and Blankenship took the form of an integrated system; it departed 
entirely from the TIROS-derived technology of its predecessors. The two 
men visited meteorologists at work, and then examined what the industry 
could produce. Instead of starting with a sensor in space and determining 
what it might tell the user about the weather, these two based the Block 5 
design on the users’ wish to receive a product in a form that approached as 
closely as possible the weather charts and maps that…the meteorologists 
employed.…A survey of the industry and new technologies revealed line 
scanning sensors and advances in highly sensitive visible light and 
infrared point (as opposed to array) detectors….[T]hey reasoned, one now 
could let the motion of the satellite provide the scanning along the line-of 
flight. That would require a spacecraft that always ‘looked down,’ rather 
than one that wheeled along its orbit. But a satellite stabilized on three 
axes would make possible acquiring a strip of imagery of indefinite length, 
imagery that could be rectified at will. (Hall, 2001) 
These factors shaped the design of the Block 5 series of satellites which ultimately 
enabled “nadir visual-imaging resolution at the Earth’s surface [to be] improved to 
0.3 nm during daytime and 2 nm at night through quarter-moonlight illumination levels” 
(Hall, 2001). The system met both the field commander’s tactical and the NRO’s 
strategic needs. The “slab-sided, tube-shaped Block 5 satellite remained 30 inches in 
diameter, but its height increased to 40 inches and its weight rose to 230 pounds” (Hall, 
2001). Three Block 5 satellites were built before requirements changed, requiring greater 
tactical meteorological support and thus the reason for three Block 5A spacecrafts, five 
Block 5B, and three Block 5C as found in Table 6. The latter two Blocks of satellites 
were larger:   
84 inches in height, and heavier, at 425 pounds, these spacecraft 
exclusively required use of the updated booster called Thor/Burner IIA. 
Block 5B spacecraft added a large sunshade on the ‘morning birds,’ a 
more powerful 20-watt traveling-wave-tube amplifier (TWTA) transmitter 
that radiated ample power for receipt aboard ships, a second primary data 
recorder, and a gamma-radiation detector. Block 5C added a vertical 
temperature/moisture profile sensor and an improved IR sensor that now 
achieved a resolution of 0.3 nm at the Earth’s surface. (Hall, 2001) 
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Table 6.   DMSP Blocks 5A thru 5C Satellites and Boosters (After Hall, 2001; Shaltanis, 2000; Heyman 2007; Bohlson, 2007) 
Blocks 5: A, B, & C 













70 30 Apr 70 
19 Mar 
71 78 
Spacecraft failed due to excessive 




Burner II 3 Sep 70 15 Feb 71 UNK 164 







71 3 Mar 73 UNK 746 
V recorder failed, sensor failed due to 








71 27 Apr 72 
27 Apr 
72 196 
Rapid satellite degradation due to 
damage from backflow of heat from 
















73 24 Jan 77 UNK 1257 












Moisture Recorder, IR, 
OLS 
Thor/ 






75 30 Nov 77 
30 Nov 
77 922 
Primary sensor degraded due to 







76 - N/A 0 
Launch failure: Booster ran out of fuel 
before achieving orbit 
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By the early 1970s, the initial size and shape of the Block 5 spacecrafts was no 
longer appropriate for the sensors it had to carry.  “Moreover, this design, which took 
advantage of spin stabilization for internal thermal control, was ill suited to Block 5 
operations in a ‘de-spun’ three axis stabilized attitude” (Hall, 2001). Another requirement 
was for the satellites to last longer on orbit. One way to achieve this requirement was to 
procure a larger spacecraft that would have enough space and power to allow for 
redundant components. Studies for Block 6 satellites began in the early 1970s but 
changing the name of the Block signified “a new start” and the political climate at the 
time was not favorable to the DoD starting a new military weather program during a 
period when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was more in favor of 
combining the military and civil meteorological programs. So, the Air Force decided to 
call the new spacecraft a modification of Block 5C and appropriated funds for five Block 
5D spacecrafts in 1972. Greater pointing accuracy and the need to carry more instruments 
were added as new requirements which caused an increase in cost and delayed the initial 
launch to 1976. However, this delay coupled with the unanticipated launch failure of the 
last Block 5C-3 spacecraft (F-34), resulted in poor DMSP weather coverage between 
1975 and 1977 (Hall, 2001). 
In 1972 the OMB requested that the DoD and Department of Commerce (DoC) 
study the feasibility of consolidating both the military and civil programs and using one 
spacecraft for both. The study “concluded that the greatest savings would be realized in a 
single national meteorological satellite system managed by the Air Force, using a 
standard DMSP Block-5D satellite. This uncivil solution was quickly rejected by 
Congressmen who argued that it would violate the National Aeronautics and Space Act” 
(Hall, 2001). So to gain major cost savings, going forward, both agreed to use a larger 
version of the Block 5D spacecraft, so as to accommodate DoC’s requirement for a larger 
spacecraft to carry additional sensors for NOAA. This change resulted in the first five 
spacecrafts being designated Block 5D-1 and later ones as Block 5D-2. 
The Block 5D-1 design…resembled in appearance conventional Earth-
oriented satellites of this period. Sized to fit the space taken by the Burner 
IIA solid-propellant upper stage on the Thor…was five feet in diameter 
and 20 feet long….built by RCA consisted of three sections….A 
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deployable, 6-by-16 foot sun-tracking solar array was also mounted 
aft....With its complement of additional sensors, the spacecraft weighed 
1,150 pounds, making it more than twice as massive as its Block 5C 
predecessors. To heft the additional weight into orbit, the program office 
contracted with Boeing for a new, larger, solid propellant second stage. 
The original Burner-IIA second stage, now adapted as a third stage and 
fixed to the satellite, was used during ascent to inject the vehicle into its 
circular, sun-synchronous 450 nautical mile Earth orbit. (Hall, 2001) 
Due to greater complexity of the Block 5D-2 satellites driven by NOAA’s needs, 
the initial launch was delayed from 1980 to 1982. This delay coupled with the launch 
failure of the last Block 5D-1 satellite (F-5) in July 1980, created the first ever gap in 
military weather coverage from August 1980 to December 1982, since the program began 
in early 1960s (Hall, 2001).   
The Block 5D-2 spacecrafts grew in length from 20 to 22.5 feet although the 
electronic components remained relatively the same. The solar array increased in size to 
eight by sixteen feet to give increased power. Two additional sensors were also added. 
This combined change caused the Block 5D-2 spacecrafts to now weigh 1,792 pounds; 
heavier than what the Thor/Burner IIA could launch and thus the change to the Atlas E 
launch vehicle. After the first five satellites were built in this block, an additional four 
were built in a Block 5D-2 follow-on program (Hall, 2001).   
The Block 5D-3 spacecrafts, the current block being launched, were designed 
from the 1970s and to be compatible with launching from the space shuttle. Their length 
increased by 2 feet, to 24 feet long, hosted an improved Operational Line Scan sensor, 
more secondary sensors, a larger solar array, larger capacity batteries, a redesigned 
sunshade, and weighs 2,278 pounds. These changes resulted in an anticipated mean 
mission lifetime of five years on orbit. (Hall, 2001)  Tables 7 and 8 show a summary of 
the satellites and boosters for Blocks 5D-1, 2, and 3, while Table 9 shows their sensor 
complements. The program’s last two satellites remain to be launched from this block. 
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Table 8.   DMSP Block 5D-3 Satellites and Boosters (After Hall, 2001; Shaltanis, 2000; Heyman, 2007; Bohlson, 2007) 
Blocks 5D: 1 & 2 












See Table 9 for a 
list of sensors on 
each Satellite 





5D-3 satellite with 5D-2 
sensors 
2 legacy tape & 2 digital 
recorders 
Secondary satellite in early 
morning orbit 
Blk5D-3 
F-16 Titan II 
18 Oct 





4 digital solid state recorders 
on this S/C and later 
satellites  
Secondary Satellite in mid 
morning orbit 
Blk5D-3 
F-17 Delta IV 
4 Nov 
06 
Currently primary S/C in Early Morning 
orbit 
Upgraded navigation 
package to 1 IMU & 1 MIMU 
& 4 digital recorders 
Blk5D-3 
F-18 Atlas V 
18 Oct 
09 
Currently primary S/C in Mid morning 
orbit 
Upgraded navigation 




(scheduled) Currently scheduled for 2013 
Further upgraded to Dual 




(scheduled) Currently scheduled for 2014 
Dual MIMUs & 1 Star 
tracker; last satellite in this 
block & built for the  DMSP 
program 
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Table 9.   Blocks 5D-1, 5D-2, and 5D-3 Sensor Complements (After Bohlson, 2007) 
 Satellite Date Launched Sensor Complement 
Block 5D-1: 
 F-1 11 Sep 76 OLS, SSH, SSJ13, SSB, Contamination 
Monitor 
 F-2 4 Jun 77 OLS, SSH, SSJ/3, SSB, SSB/O, IFM, 
SSI/E, SSI/P 
 F-3 30 Apr 78 OLS, SSH, SSJ/3, SSB, CFE-3R 
 F-4 6 Jun 79 OLS, SSH, SSJ/3, SSI/E, SSMIT, SSC, 
SSD 
 F-5 14 Jul 80 OLS, SSH-2, SSJ13, SSI/E, SSBIO, SSR 
Block 5D-2: 
 F-6 20 Dec 82 OLS, SSH-2, SSI/E, SSJ/4, SSBA 
 F-7 17 Nov 83 OLS, SSM/T, SSI/E, SSJ/4, SSB, SSJ*M, 
SSM 
 F-8 18 Jun 87 OLS, SSMII, SSM/T, SSI/ES, SSJ14, 
SSB/X-M 
 F-9 2 Feb 88 OLS, SSM/T, SSI/ES, SSJ/4, SSB/X 
 F-10 1 Dec 90 OLS, SSM/I, SSM/T, SSI/ES, SSJ/4, 
SSB/X-2 
 F-11 28 Nov 91 OLS, SSM/I SSM/T, SSJ14, SSIIES-2, 
SSBIX-2, SSM 
 F-12 29 Aug 94 OLS, SSMII, SSMIT, SSM/T-2, SSJ/4, 
SSI/ES-2, SSB/X-2 
 F-13 24 Mar 95 OLS, SSM/I, SSM/T, SSM/T-2, SSJ/4, 
SSI/ES-2, SB/X-2, SSM, SSZ 
 F-14 4 Apr 97 OLS, SSM/I , SSM/T, SSM/T-2, SSJ/4, 
SSI/ES-2, SSB/X-2, SSM 
Block 5D-3 
 F-15 12 Dec 99 OLS, SSM/I , SSM/T, SSM/T-2, SSJ/4, 
SSI/ES-2, SSM, SSZ 
 F-16 18 Oct 03 OLS,SSMIS,SSI/ES-3, SSJ/5, SSULI, 
SSUSI, SSM, SSF 
 F-17 4 Nov 06 OLS,SSMIS,SSI/ES-3, SSJ/5, SSULI, 
SSUSI, SSM, SSF 
 F-18 18 Oct 09 OLS,SSMIS,SSI/ES-3, SSJ/5, SSULI, 
SSUSI, SSM, SSF 
 F-19 Currently scheduled 
for 2013  
OLS,SSMIS,SSI/ES-3, SSJ/5, SSULI, 
SSUSI, SSM, SSF 
 F-20 Currently scheduled 
for 2014 
OLS,SSMIS,SSI/ES-3, SSJ/5, SSULI, 
SSUSI, SSM, SSF 
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1. Current Program 
The current DMSP Block 5D-3 consists of six satellites, four of which have been 
launched and are currently operational. DMSP satellites fly in two orbits designated as 
early-morning and mid-morning based on the time that they cross the equator. Two 
satellites from the previous block, F-13 and F-14, are still on orbit and performing with 
degraded capabilities; they are termed as Tactical satellites. So, currently there are a total 
of six satellites on orbit. The primary operational satellites are F-17 and F-18, while two 
secondary and two tactical satellites remain with degraded capabilities: F-16, F-15, F-14, 
and F-13, respectively. The final two satellites, F-19 and F-20, are currently being 
prepared for launches in 2013 and 2014, initially based on anticipated end of life (EOL) 
for F-17 and F-18, but now subject to change and based on decisions from the follow-on 
program. Figure 8 shows the current DMSP constellation with the satellites Local Times 
at Ascending Nodes (LTAN).  
 
Figure 8.   Configuration of DMSP Constellation (From DMSG Program Office, 2009) 
 38 
Similar to previous DMSP satellite blocks, Block 5D-3 has its share of updates to 
some of the satellites within its block after they were built and delivered. In the case of 
Block 5D-3 satellites, it is mainly due to parts obsolescence issues because the satellites 
were built and kept in storage from the late 1990s. In fact, the last satellite was built in 
1998 and certain parts have started to degrade. So, in 2006 a Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) began so as to address this parts degradation issue thereby extend the 
mission life and increase reliability for the last two satellites (Bohlson, 2007). Of the 22 
items identified to improve the overall performance, one of the main ones for the 
spacecraft was to replace the old Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) that contained 
mechanical gyros with newer technology ring laser gyros in the Miniature Inertial 
Measurement Units (MIMUs) (Bohlson, 2007). The IMUs were causing premature 
failure on orbit. Adding one each to F-17 and F-18 restored their reliability back to 
nominal.   For improved reliability and extend life of the spacecraft, the program office 
decided to add an additional MIMU and a Star Tracker to each of the last two spacecrafts, 
F-19 and F-20. This change allows DoD to reasonably expect these satellites to last a 
minimum of 60 months on orbit. This life extension is especially important to the 
Warfighter and the nation especially because of NPOESS’ significant delay and 
subsequent cancellation and DWSS’ cancellation, DoD will require more time to acquire 
and field new satellites.    
2. Proposed Follow-On 
With the 1993 prompting by OMB and Congressional committees to justify 
separate military and civil polar orbiting metrological satellites, DoD, DoC, and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) met to study the issue. The joint 
recommendation was to combine the two programs, a similar conclusion which was 
reached 32 years before (in 1961) but did not materialize because then Under Secretary of 
the Air Force and head of the NRO, Joseph V. Charyk, remained unconvinced that it 
would work (Hall, 2001).   However, because by 1993 space-based weather observations 
had been developed and proven, it was harder to justify the existence of two separate 
programs. This led to President William Clinton’s issuing a Presidential Decision 
Directive on May 5, 1994, to merge the two programs. This directive produced a “tri-
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agency” program that would “create an Integrated Program Office that would develop, 
acquire, and operate the converged National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite system (NPOESS)” (Hall, 2001).   NOAA was designated to have the overall 
responsibility for the converged system, DoD to contract, acquire, and launch the 
satellites, and NASA was responsible for “facilitating the development and incorporation 
of new cost-effective technologies into the converged system” (Hall, 2001). Figure 9 
shows the NPOESS program’s roles and responsibilities based on GAO’s analysis of 
NPOESS program office data.  
 
Figure 9.   NPOESS Program Roles and Responsibilities (From GAO, 2010, p.7) 
The original NPOESS program estimate was $6.5 billion, for 24 years, starting in 
1995 through 2018 and procurement of six satellites containing 13 instruments. However, 
by the time the development contract was to be awarded in 2002, the new estimate was 
$7 billion. Additionally, a demonstration satellite, NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), a 
joint mission between NPOESS and NASA was to be built and launched several years 
before the first NPOESS satellite. Its purpose was to test four of NPOESS’ sensors on 
orbit and provide the program office with early performance information (GAO, 2010, 
May). 
 40 
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded in 2002, the 
schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the 
NPOESS satellites be available to backup the final POES and DMSP 
satellites should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these 
satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 
2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final 
POES satellite launch then planned for March 2008, and (3) having the 
second NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite 
launch then planned for October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not 
needed to back up the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch 
dates would have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively. (GAO, 
2010, May, p. 8) 
After significant schedule delays and cost growth by November 2005, breaching 
the 25% threshold for Nunn-McCurdy, the program was recertified and re-baselined in 
2006 with a new estimated cost of $12.5 billion through 2024, delay of NPP and the first 
two NPOESS satellites (called C1 and C2) by three to five years and reducing the number 
of satellites from six to four. In addition, the number of sensors was reduced from 13 to 9, 
four of whose functionality also were reduced. This reduction in satellites caused the U.S. 
Government to rely on a European satellite, called Meteorological Operational (MetOp), 
to cover the midmorning orbit while NPOESS would cover the early morning and 
afternoon orbits. (GAO, 2010, May)  Table 10 shows these changes. 
Table 10.   Major Changes to the NPOESS Program by the Nunn-McCurdy  




The reduction in sensors and functionality “affected the number and quality of the 
resulting weather and environmental products.” (GAO, 2010, May). For these reasons, in 
2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee re-manifested some of the sensors. Table 11 
shows these changes for NPP and the four NPOESS satellites, C1 through C4. 
Table 11.   Configuration of Sensors Planned for NPP and NPOESS Satellites, as of  
May 2008 (From GAO, 2010, May, p .12) 
 
 
Between the restructuring of June 2006 through June 2009, various acquisition challenges 
continued to plague the NPOESS program, resulting in increased life-cycle cost estimates 
(GAO estimates based on their analysis of contractor data) and later launch dates as 
shown in Table 12.   
Table 12.   Changes in NPOESS Life-Cycle Cost Estimates and Estimated Satellite  
Launch (From GAO, 2010, May, p .12) 
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Acting on the recommendation of an independent review team, in August 2009, a task 
force was formed by the Executive Office of the President, led by the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP), to investigate the NPOESS issues. On February 1, 2010, 
after 16 years, over $5 billion spent, more than five years launch schedule delays, and 
still nothing launched:  
The director of OSTP announced that NOAA and DoD will no longer 
jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would 
plan and acquire its own satellite system. Specifically, NOAA is to be 
responsible for the afternoon orbit and the observations planned for the 
first and third NPOESS satellites. DoD is to be responsible for the 
morning orbit and the observations planned for the second and fourth 
NPOESS satellites. The partnership with the European satellite agencies 
for the midmorning orbit is to continue as planned. (GAO, 2010, May) 
This means that DoD is now responsible to maintain one spacecraft in the early 
morning orbit, a reduction from the two orbits that it currently flies in and has done since 
March 18, 1965 (Hall, 2001). Figure 10 shows the current configuration of the 
operational polar satellites that U.S. Government relies on for space based weather 
capabilities. In addition to the two DMSP primary satellites and one MetOp satellite on 
orbit, there is also one Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) that 
was launched February 2009, the last of the POES series of satellites (GAO, 2010, May). 
 
Figure 10.   Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites  
(From GAO, 2010, p. 4) 
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With the DoD now only responsible for the early morning orbit and having two 
satellites remaining to be launched (F-19, and F-20), it has more time than DoC before its 
first satellite is needed. DoD expected to officially begin the new DWSS program in 2013 
(GAO, 2010, May). Table 13 shows a comparison of what NPOESS was supposed to be 
post Nunn-McCurdy in 2006, to what it became as of February 2010 when the decision 
was made to disband it, and now the initial thoughts on the new NOAA (Joint Polar 
Satellite System–JPASS) and DoD (DWSS) acquisitions.  
Table 13.   Comparison of NPOESS to the New NOAA and DoD Acquisitions  






In chapters IV and V, this thesis assesses and makes recommendations as to what 
the DoD acquisition program should be for the next generation of satellites.   Figure 11 
shows the current and planned satellites (as of May 2010) with potential weather data 
gaps. It shows DMSP F-20 being launched in Mid-morning orbit but that is subject to 
change based on a number of factors such as ongoing studies, on-orbit performance of 
DMSP F-17, and the fact that DoD is now only responsible for the early morning 
orbit.
 
Figure 11.   Planned Launch Dates and Potential Gaps in Satellite Data  
(From GAO, 2010, p. 24) 
Based on the February 2010 announcement for DoD to take over the early 
morning, “[t]he DWSS program is expected to satisfy environmental monitoring 
requirements in the early morning orbit by developing and launching two satellites, with 
an initial capability no earlier than 2018” (GAO, 2011, May). This formed the initial 
acquisition strategy for the DWSS program that was subsequently cancelled in 2012. 
Dr. Aston Carter’s (USD/AT&L) August 13, 2010 Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) approved the purchase of two spacecrafts from Northrop 
Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS). These are modified versions of the NPOESS C 
bus, approximately 40% smaller, 2600 kg lighter and have a seven-year design life. They 
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were to host three sensors: Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor, 
Microwave Sensor based on legacy requirements, and a Space Environmental Monitor 
(SEM) sensor suite (Baldonado, 2011). On May 24, 2011, Northrop Grumman Space and 
Mission Systems: 
Received a $427.9 million contract modification, commissioning them to 
modify the NPOESS baseline to establish the Defense Weather Satellite 
System baseline. That means going back to design and development, 
including work to add…Pentagon mission assurance and compliance 
requirements. (Defense Industry Daily, 2011) 
However, on September 15, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee released in the 
2012 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, the statement that:  
The current program [DWSS] remains challenged by a difficult and 
confusing set of management issues. Rights over intellectual property 
from the NPOESS program have been subject to protracted and 
contentious negotiations. For DWSS, redesign efforts are being conducted 
simultaneously with efforts to examine capability trades. Options for 
capability trades results in billions of dollars of uncertainty in cost 
estimates, and may lead to significant redesigns. Each of these areas of 
risk indicate that DWSS is not on a sound acquisition footing, despite the 
restructure of the program more than a year and a half ago. The 
Committee does not want to repeat the costly mistakes of the NPOESS 
program with DWSS. Therefore, the Committee recommends the 
termination of the DWSS program, and provides $250,000,000 for 
continued sensor development, as well as requirements definition and 
source selection activities for a full and open competition for a follow-on 
program. The Committee also provides $150,000,000 for the cost of 
termination of the current contract, and directs the Secretary of Defense to 
provide the congressional defense committees with a report within 30 days 
of enactment of this act to describe the Government’s estimated liabilities 
under the current contract, the ability of the Government to leverage prior 
work within a new program, and a schedule for requirements, reviews, 
competition, and award of a new development contract. (Senate Bill, 
2011)    
On January 25, 2012, the Space and Missile Systems Center issued a news release 
that the “U.S. Air Force has stopped work on the Defense Weather Satellite System to 
implement the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act and FY 12 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act” (SMC, 2012).  
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This section, Section C, served to give a detailed chronological history of the 
DMSP program: how the program started, its purpose, simplicity of initial satellite 
blocks, evolution of their size and complexity based on various decisions, capability 
changes that were made to the satellites and showing how the program evolved to where 
it is today. This history forms a reference for what the follow-on program, and hence this 
thesis’ recommendation, should be (Chapters IV and V). Having a thorough 
understanding of the program’s past, especially lessons learned, consequences of 
decisions made, and knowing factors that are currently affecting the program, will help 
define what the program of the future should be.  
D. THE MILSATCOM PROGRAM 
MILSATCOM refers to a system of systems working together to cover a broad 
range of users. 
Military Satellite Communications (or milsatcom) systems are typically 
categorized as wideband, protected, or narrowband. Wideband systems 
emphasize high capacity. Protected systems stress antijam features, 
covertness, and nuclear survivability. Narrowband systems emphasize 
support to users who need voice or low-data-rate communications and 
who also may be mobile or otherwise disadvantaged (because of limited 
terminal capability, antenna size, environment, etc.). (Elfers & Miller, 
2002) 
The MILSATCOM system consists of several satellites which began with the 
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) constellation in the 1960s. This 
constellation of satellites covers the Wideband aspect of the communication spectrum. 
Throughout the years, these satellites were acquired using a block approach. The first 
block consisted of 26 satellites. The second block, DSCS II, consisted of 16 satellites and 
was launched from 1971 through 1978 (Boehm, n.d.).   
Similar to the DSCS constellation, the MILSTAR constellation is a group of 
legacy satellites. It provides coverage to users requiring protected and secure 
communications. These satellites were also acquired in blocks; the first block consists of 
two satellites that were launched in the early 1990s, carrying low data rate payloads 
(MILSTAR fact sheet, 2011) 
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Figure 12 shows the names and timelines associated with the various satellite 
constellations that fall into each of the three categories that make up the communications 
framework. The slide was taken from a presentation given at a 2006 DoD Commercial 
SATCOM Workshop. At that time, the TSAT program was scheduled to be the follow-on 
program to link all three systems of systems; however, due to a number of reasons, to 
include not meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements, the program was 
cancelled in 2009. This thesis only addressed satellites that were acquired to provide the 
Wideband and Protected aspects of the communications architecture.  

























Continuous Communication capacity Improvement
 
Figure 12.   MILSATCOM Evolution (From Whitney, 2006) 
1. Current Program 
The third and current DSCS III satellite block built by Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems Company (LMSSC), consists of 14 satellites, eight of which are in a 
geosynchronous orbit and forms the on-orbit constellation while one is used for testing 
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purposes is in a super synchronous orbit. Nine satellites are currently operational. The 
final four of the 14 satellites received SLEP modifications (DSCS fact sheet, 2011).   
The second block of MILSTAR satellites, MILSTAR II, consisting of four 
satellites were built by LMSSC. The first satellite in this block, third Milstar satellite to 
be built, was launched in 1999 but was lost because it was launched into a lower orbit and 
could not be raised so it was determined to be non-operational. The final three satellites 
were successfully launched in the early 2000s. This block is an upgrade to the first block 
with these spacecrafts carrying both low and medium data rate payload (Jane’s, 2010). 
2. Proposed Follow-on 
The follow-on system to DSCS is the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) system 
which is being built by Boeing Satellite Development Center, utilizes Boeing’s 
commercial line of 702 spacecraft and acquired via “Commercial Like” Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 12 Procurement. The capability of one WGS satellite 
is greater than the entire DSCS III constellation (Whitney, 2006). WGS is using a block 
approach to obtain a constellation of six satellites. Originally the plan was for five 
satellites but the Australian government partnered with the U.S. and funded a sixth. Block 
I, consisting of three satellites, were launched in October 2007, April 2009, and 
December 2009 and are DoD’s highest capacity communication satellites. Similarly, 
Block II consists of three satellites. Space Vehicle (SV) 4 was launched in January 2012 
and SVs 5 and 6 are scheduled for launches in 2013 and will have slight increase in 
capability over Block I satellites (WGS fact sheet, 2012). In addition, Boeing was 
awarded a contract in August 2010 to begin work on a Block II follow-on program, 
procuring long lead parts for SV-7. This contract has options for a total of six more clone 
WGS satellites (Space News, 2010).  “Block II follow-on satellites 7, 8 and 9 are 
anticipated for launch in FYs 16, 17, and 18, respectively” (WGS fact sheet, 2012). 
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system is the follow-on 
system to 1990s-era MILSTAR, providing ten times more capacity of protected and 
secure communications (AEHF fact sheet, 2011). It is also being built by LMSSC and 
utilizes their heritage commercial A2100 Bus design with advanced technology from the 
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commercial sector (Whitney, 2006). The original acquisition plan was for three satellites 
to be placed in the geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) and then a fourth was added. The 
first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010 after being delayed by almost six 
years. With the cancellation of the TSAT program, the DoD intends to procure two more 
satellites, using the new satellite acquisition strategy approach, EASE. The AEHF 
program decided to keep the design specifications for the first three satellites (AEHF 1, 2, 
and 3) the same as those for the last three satellites and only make adjustments for parts 
obsolescence (GAO, May 2011). 
Section D gave a summary of the evolution of U.S. Military communication 
satellites, paying particular attention to the block acquisitions that occurred, and planned 
for the future for Wideband and Protected communication satellites. This information 
will be used in Chapter V to develop recommendations for the DMSP follow-on program. 
E. THE GPS PROGRAM 
GPS refers to a space based system of system that provides precise position, 
navigation, and timing (PNT) to users worldwide. It originally began in the late 1950s as 
four separate concepts. One was developed by scientists at Johns Hopkins University’s 
Applied Physics Lab in September 1958, called Transit, and later turned over to the U.S. 
Navy (Milsatmagazine, 2008). Another concept called 621B was started by the U.S. Air 
Force in the late 1960s. At the same time, the Naval Research Laboratory started a 
parallel program called Timation (Time Navigation). In addition, the U.S. Army had a 
concept called SECOR (Sequential Correlation of Range System) with its first launch in 
January 1964 and other launches through 1969 (Boehn, n.d.). The system that became 
GPS as it is known today came from the Navy’s and Air Force’s concepts. This occurred 
after then “Deputy Secretary of the Defense William P, Clements authorized the start of a 
program to ‘test and evaluate the concepts and costs of an advanced navigation system’ 
on April 17, 1973, and he authorized the start of concept validation for the GPS system 
on December 22, 1973” (Milsatmagazine, 2008). The GPS system is a constellation of 
24 satellites in a six orbital planes.   
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Similar to DMSP and MILSATCOM satellites, these satellites were acquired in 
blocks. Block I with a design life of five years consisted of 11 satellites (one of which 
failed to reach orbit) were launched in 1978 through 1985 with the final satellite deemed 
unusable in November 1995 (USNO, 2011). They were built by Rockwell International. 
The second block of satellites contains several incremental improvements within it and 
are designated as Blocks II, IIA (A - for advance), IIR (R - for replenishment), IIR-M  
(M – for modernization to IIR), and IIF (F – for follow-on) series. Block II and IIA series 
satellite design life was 7.3 years and contained four atomic clocks each (USNO, 2011). 
They were built by Rockwell International which later became Boeing in 1997. Together, 
Blocks II and IIA series satellites completed the 24 satellite operational constellation 
required for GPS. Block II series, consisting of nine satellites, was the first full scale 
operational satellites and was launched from 1989 through 1990. Its last satellite was 
decommissioned in March 2007 (USNO, 2011). 
1. Current Program 
The current GPS program consists of satellites remaining from the 19 Block IIA 
series satellites launched from 1990 through 1997. These are the second series of 
operational satellites. Block IIR satellites, the replenishment satellites, built by Lockheed 
Martin, were launched from July 1997 through November 2004 (USNO, 2011).  Thirteen 
satellites were built but the first one failed to reach orbit; their design life was 7.8 years. 
In August 2000, Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract to modernize the eight 
remaining un-launched Block IIR satellites (GPS IIR/R-M fact sheet, 2011). These Block 
IIR-M satellites were launched from September 2005 through August 2009 and contained 
incremental improvements such as a second civil signal L2C (USNO, 2011). The 20th 
satellite in this Block IIR/R-M, IIR-20M (also known as space vehicle number (SVN) 
49), carried the additional dedicated civil L5 signal for demonstration purposes (GPS 
IIR/R-M fact sheet, 2011). Beginning in 1996 Boeing was contracted to build the follow-
on Block 2F series satellites (GPS IIF fact sheet, 2011). Twelve are currently on contract 
to be built; the first two of which were launched May 2010 and July 2011, respectively. 
The first satellite was delayed by 4.5 yrs and has cost 119% more than its initial estimate 
(GAO, 2011, May). These satellites include enhancements such as a dedicated civil 
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signal (L-5), improved accuracy, greater security, anti-jam capabilities, and an increased 
design life of 12 years. Table 14 shows a list of information such as launch order, date, 
SVN, frequency standard for the current Block II, IIA, IIR, IIR-M, and IIF series 
satellites, while Figure 13 shows pictures of what they look like. 
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Table 14.   GPS Block II/IIA/IIR/IIR-M/IIF Series Satellites (After: USNO, 2011, June) 
 
      LAUNCH                 LAUNCH       FREQ            U.S. SPACE 
      ORDER    PRN  SVN       DATE        STD     PLANE   COMMAND ** 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
      *II-1          14     14 FEB 1989                    19802 
      *II-2          13     10 JUN 1989                    20061 
      *II-3          16     18 AUG 1989                    20185 
      *II-4          19     21 OCT 1989                    20302 
      *II-5          17     11 DEC 1989                    20361 
      *II-6          18     24 JAN 1990                    20452 
      *II-7          20     26 MAR 1990                    20533 
      *II-8          21     02 AUG 1990                    20724 
      *II-9          15     01 OCT 1990                    20830 
       IIA-10   32   23     26 NOV 1990    Rb       E5     20959 
       IIA-11   24   24     04 JUL 1991    Cs       D5     21552 
      *IIA-12        25     23 FEB 1992    Rb       A5     21890 
      *IIA-13        28     10 APR 1992                    21930 
       IIA-14   26   26     07 JUL 1992    Rb       F5     22014 
       IIA-15   27   27     09 SEP 1992    Cs       A4     22108 
      *IIA-16        32     22 NOV 1992             F6     22231 
      *IIA-17        29     18 DEC 1992                    22275 
      *IIA-18        22     03 FEB 1993                    22446 
      *IIA-19        31     30 MAR 1993                    22581 
      *IIA-20        37     13 MAY 1993                    22657 
       IIA-21   09   39     26 JUN 1993    Cs       A1     22700 
      *IIA-22        35     30 AUG 1993    Rb              22779 
       IIA-23   04   34     26 OCT 1993    Rb       D4     22877 
       IIA-24   06   36     10 MAR 1994    Rb       C5     23027 
       IIA-25   03   33     28 MAR 1996    Cs       C2     23833 
       IIA-26   10   40     16 JUL 1996    Cs       E3     23953 
       IIA-27   30   30     12 SEP 1996    Cs       B2     24320 
       IIA-28   08   38     06 NOV 1997    Cs       A3     25030 
    ***IIR-1         42     17 JAN 1997 
       IIR-2    13   43     23 JUL 1997    Rb       F3     24876 
       IIR-3    11   46     07 OCT 1999    Rb       D2     25933 
       IIR-4    20   51     11 MAY 2000    Rb       E1     26360 
       IIR-5    28   44     16 JUL 2000    Rb       B3     26407 
       IIR-6    14   41     10 NOV 2000    Rb       F1     26605 
       IIR-7    18   54     30 JAN 2001    Rb       E4     26690 
       IIR-8    16   56     29 JAN 2003    Rb       B1     27663 
       IIR-9    21   45     31 MAR 2003    Rb       D3     27704 
       IIR-10   22   47     21 DEC 2003    Rb       E2     28129 
       IIR-11   19   59     20 MAR 2004    Rb       C3     28190 
       IIR-12   23   60     23 JUN 2004    Rb       F4     28361 
       IIR-13   02   61     06 NOV 2004    Rb       D1     28474 
       IIR-14M  17   53     26 SEP 2005    Rb       C4     28874 
       IIR-15M  31   52     25 SEP 2006    Rb       A2     29486 
       IIR-16M  12   58     17 NOV 2006    Rb       B4     29601 
       IIR-17M  15   55     17 OCT 2007    Rb       F2     32260 
       IIR-18M  29   57     20 DEC 2007    Rb       C1     32384 
       IIR-19M  07   48     15 MAR 2008    Rb       A6     32711 
       IIR-20M  01   49     24 MAR 2009    Rb       B6     34661 
       IIR-21M  05   50     17 AUG 2009    Rb       E6     35752 
       IIF-1    25   62     28 MAY 2010    Rb       B2     36585 
       IIF-2                16 JUL 2011    Rb                      
 
    *  Satellite is no longer in service. 
   **  U.S. SPACE COMMAND, previously known as the NORAD object number; 
       also referred to as the NASA Catalog number. Assigned at 
       successful launch. Catalog numbers retrieved from SPACEWARN   Bulletins: 
       http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/spacewarn/ 





























Figure 13.   GPS Evolution (From Milsatmagazine, 2008) 
2. Proposed Follow-On 
The current contract for the third block of GPS satellites, GPS III, an increment 
contract awarded to Lockheed Martin in May 2008, is for “the development and 
production of two initial space vehicles (SV) with options for up to ten additional SVs” 
(GPS III fact sheet, 2011). This new block of satellites will provide new capabilities to 
meet greater demands of both the military and civilian communities. This block will also 
follow an incremental approach within the block (similar to Block II) to deliver increase 
in capability. For example, according to the GPS III fact sheet (2011), the first eight 
satellites (SV 1–8) will have increased accuracy, increased M-Code Earth coverage 
power, additional civil signal (L1C), and improved integrity. However, SV 9 and 
onwards will have digital waveform generator, real-time signal modulates L-Band carrier, 
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distress alerting satellite system, enables global search and rescue, real time command 
and control cross links, allows satellite uploads via single contact, and improve 
constellation accuracy. In addition, the design life for these satellites has been increased 
to 15 years with mean mission duration of 13 years. The launch date of the first GPS IIIA 
is currently scheduled for May 2014 (GAO, 2011, May). 
Section E gave a summary of the evolution of GPS satellites, paying particular 
attention to the various incremental improvements and block acquisitions that occurred 
and what is planned for the future. This information will be used in Chapters V to 
develop recommendations for the DMSP follow-on program. 
F. TOYOTA’S APPROACH TO CREATING NEW MODELS OR UPDATE 
EXISTING MODELS 
Toyota’s approach to producing vehicles is summed up by the 14 principles that 
Jeffery Liker identified as “The Toyota Way” after studying the Toyota Company for 20 
years (Liker, 2004). These principles, shown in Figures 14 through 17, have guided 
Toyota’s manufacturing process to strive for constant quality, making the process a 
renowned excellence model. We can derive great information on their approach by 
reviewing these principles and the associated explanations that accompany each 
principle.   
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Figure 14.   Principles 1 through 4 of The Toyota Way (From Liker, 2004) 
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Figure 15.   Principles 5 through 7 of The Toyota Way (From Liker, 2004) 
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Figure 16.   Principles 8 through 10 of The Toyota Way (From Liker, 2004) 
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Figure 17.   Principles 11 through 14 of The Toyota Way (From Liker, 2004) 
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Based on these principles, Toyota has been able to engineer and manufacture 
“autos that led to unbelievable consistency in the process and product. Toyota designed 
autos faster, with more reliability, yet at a competitive cost, even when paying the 
relatively high wages of Japanese workers” (Liker, 2004). A review of these principles 
show that none of them are unique to the automotive industry and nothing precludes them 
from being applied to others industries such as Space Acquisitions. In fact, several of 
them (Principles 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 14) will resurface in Chapter III, where FIST and EASE 
processes are reviewed.   
Toyota’s acquisition process is truly unique. Liker summarizes it as follows: 
The incredible consistency of Toyota’s performance is a direct result of 
operational excellence. Toyota has turned operational excellence into a 
strategic weapon. This operational excellence is based in part on tool and 
quality improvement methods made famous by Toyota in the 
manufacturing world, such as just-in-time, kaizen, one-piece flow, jidoka, 
and heijunka. These techniques helped spawn the “lean manufacturing” 
revolution. But tools and techniques are no secret weapon for 
manufacturing a business. Toyota’s continued success at implementing 
these tools stems from a deeper business philosophy based on its 
understanding of people and human motivation. Its success is ultimately 
based on its ability to cultivate leadership, teams, and culture, to devise 
strategy, to build supplier relationships, and to maintain a learning 
organization. (2004) 
Toyota’s processes are demonstrated below by using the Toyota Highlander 
which is:   
Toyota’s car-based midsize SUV that is updated for 2011 with new 
exterior styling. The Highlander was completely redesigned for 2008, the 
first redesign since it was introduced as a 2001 model. Built on a unibody 
platform with 4-wheel independent suspension, the Highlander offers a 
tight, quiet ride like a midsize sedan with the higher ride height, available 
4-wheel drive and cargo capacity of a midsize SUV. (MSN Autos, 2011)  
Once Toyota creates a product and once proven, they implement it fleet-wide and 
do not start over the process from one model to the next (Principle 8 above). Thus, there 
is a high percentage of reused technology across models and from year to year 
improvements within model (Principle 6 above). The example below also shows 
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similarities between the automotive industry and Space Acquisitions, specifically, the 
block approach and incremental improvements within each block.  
There are two generations of the Highlander, those built from 2001 through 2007, 
and 2008 through 2012 (equivalent to space acquisition’s satellite blocks). Within these 
two generations there were incremental improvements. Specifically, Highlanders 
produced for model years 2001 through 2003 remained relatively the same and then 
Toyota made a few minor modifications which it implemented on the 2004 through 2007 
model years.  One such example was an engine upgrade. The original 3.0 liter V6 engine 
produced 220 horse power (hp) at 5800 revolutions per minute (RPMs) and 222 foot-
pounds (ft-lbs) of torque at 4400 RPMs while delivering 23 miles per gallon (mpg) of gas 
at highway speeds was being fielded in the 2001–2003 models. However, they refined it 
and released an upgraded engine for the 2004 through 2007 model years (MSN Autos, 
2011).  While this engine upgrade had greater performance, it was more economical. 
Specifically, it was a 3.3 liter V6, 230 Hp at 5800 RPMs and 242 ft-lbs of torque at 4400 
RPMs while delivering 25 highway mpg (MSN Autos, 2011).  So essentially, Toyota 
made an incremental improvement within the first block of Highlanders. Once this engine 
was proven, Toyota deployed it to several other vehicles in its fleet such as the Camry, 
RAV 4, Lexus RX 330.  
Toyota made significant changes such as body style, size, and engine for 2008–
2010 models, as seen in Figure 14. Now they are offering an even more powerful engine 
that returns greater highway fuel economy than the original 3.0 V6 engine. This newest 
engine is a 3.5 liter V6 producing 270 hp at 6200 RPMs and 248 ft-lbs torque at 4700 
RPMs while delivering 24 highway mpg at the stricter government rating standards than 
previous model years (MSN Autos, 2011).  Since then, Toyota has deployed this 3.5 liter 
engine to several of its other models. Figure 14 shows some incremental upgrades made 
to the Highlander from model years 2003 to 2004 and again in 2010 to 2012. These 
incremental changes within the two “blocks” (model years 2001–2007, and 2008-present) 
are very similar to the incremental upgrades made in Space Systems as newer 
technologies become available, for example the incremental changes made between 
DMSP Block 5D-2 and 5D-3 satellites as discussed in Section C of Chapter II.  
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Figure 18.   Toyota Highlander Incremental Upgrades (After: MSN Autos, 2011) 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this chapter documented literature reviews of applicable 
information that will form the basis from which recommendations will be made in later 
chapters. It began with a review of the acquisition framework currently used for Space 
systems, to include the history of Space systems acquisitions and key influences affecting 
it today. The Air Force was identified as the responsible Service for DoD space 
acquisitions and the reason why this thesis focused on space systems acquired by the Air 
Force. Cost of space systems was identified as currently the most important factor and 
hence the main influence to how systems are acquired, not system performance 
characteristics or the time (schedule) it takes to produce systems. The history of the space 
systems that are discussed in this thesis (DMSP, MILSATCOM, and GPS) were 
reviewed, tracing their heritage back to the mid-1950s at the Western Development 
Division in Los Angeles. The culture shift that has occurred in acquisitions was 
discussed, for example, how during the first 30 years of these space programs, capability-
driven systems were built but for the latter 20 years the pendulum has swung to the other 
extreme, to being very requirements driven. Similarly, the culture change from buying 
greater quantities of less complex systems to few quantities of more complex systems 
was discussed and the unintended consequences such as programs being unaffordable, 
delays and cancellations that have occurred.   
Next, a detailed review of the entire DMSP program was conducted, to include 
the current and follow-on programs. The review began with identifying the purpose of the 
DMSP program, as an enabler of cloud free photoreconnaissance flights over the Soviet 
Union. The challenges, such as beginning as a temporary classified program and how it 
became a program of record, were discussed. The evolution of the various blocks of 
satellites was discussed and how each satellite block became more capable but larger and 
more complex at the same time. However, lessons were also learnt about how two 
periods in DMSP’s history, 1975 to 1977, and 1980 to 1982, system complexities led to 
schedule delays, and coupled with launch failures, resulted in poor and no military 
weather coverage, respectively. The relationship between DoD’s weather program and 
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DoC’s was discussed and the fact that several earlier initiatives to merge the two 
programs failed and how the 1994 presidential decision to merge them also ended in 
failure as evident with the 2010 decision to separate them. The main reasons identified 
for the failure were complexity, both in management structure and system requirements, 
and technology maturity.     
The MILSATCOM and GPS programs were similarly reviewed, particularly with 
an emphasis on their acquisition approaches. It was identified that the earlier 
MILSATCOM systems, such as DSCS followed a very similar block acquisition 
approach to DMSP with the procurement of several satellites in each block. However, as 
the progression was made from the first through the third DSCS block, the number of 
satellites in each block became fewer and fewer, from 26 to 16 and finally to 14 satellites. 
This trend has continued to the follow-on program, WGS, because the current plan is to 
procure only six satellites. While there may be valid reason for the reductions in the 
number of satellites from block to block, such as more capable and longer design satellite 
design lives, as evident with the cancellation of TSAT, there needs to be a balance with 
the expected capability jump from one block to the next. The GPS program showed more 
consistency with the number of satellites procured per block and showed more of an 
incremental increase in capability from block to block and within blocks, especially for 
block II satellites.    
Based on these reviews, the instructive model for space procurement is for block 
acquisitions with incremental increases in capability be utilized for follow-on programs. 
This concept will be better supported when the principles of FIST and EASE are 
examined in the next chapter.      
This chapter concluded with an examination of Toyota’s approach to creating new 
models. The 14 principles, according to Liker, that make up “The Toyota Way” were 
identified, which revealed Toyota’s unique acquisition approach. The Toyota Highlander 
was used to demonstrate some similarities between the automotive industry and space 
systems acquisitions, specifically, the block acquisition similarities with incremental 
improvements within. In the next chapter, each of the 14 principles will be related to 
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space acquisitions so that the relations between Toyota’s way and space systems 
development and manufacturing can be identified.   
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the cold war, reduction in military spending in the 1990s, the 
recent recession and further reductions in military spending, the DoD has significantly 
less money to spend on acquisitions. However, many of the systems that the United 
States relies on to maintain its dominance are nearing the end of their design lives and the 
need for their replacements remains valid requirements. Because of this need and less 
funding being available, the DoD has instituted several initiatives or “tools” to increase 
efficiency so as to maximize every dollar spent on Acquisition. This chapter will examine 
the principles of two such tools, FIST and EASE, and their application to space 
acquisitions. This chapter will also examine the Toyota Way Principles and their 
application to space acquisitions.  
B. APPLICATION OF THE FIST PROCESS TO SPACE ACQUISITIONS  
“Systems development projects should be done by: small teams of talented 
people using short schedules, small budgets and mature technologies. This approach is 
called FIST (Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny)” (Ward, 2010b). FIST is a model 
developed by Daniel B. Ward after years of research into systems acquisitions with a 
focus on improving the operational effectiveness of defense acquisition projects versus 
focusing solely on programmatic outcomes. It is a model that depends on what are the 
organization’s values as they relate each of the four elements: Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, 
and Tiny.       
The “four elements…ha[ve] become the FIST model for system development” 
(Ward, 2009).  These elements are in line with the 23 actions issued by Dr. Aston Carter, 
then director of USD (AT&L), in his September 14, 2010 memorandum to acquisition 
professionals to improve acquisitions. For example, “mandate affordability as a 
requirement” means treating the budget as a constraint to be maintained, not an estimate 
to be expanded later. FIST provides technical and programmatic decision-making 
guidelines that show how and why to do precisely that (Ward, 2010a).  
 66 
The FIST approach is a continuous improvement approach that requires a culture 
change from the current norm of how acquisitions are accomplished. For this approach to 
be effective, enterprise commitment is required.  “The FIST approach is most successful 
when done iteratively; it is most risky when done as a one-shot deal.” (Ward, 2009)  Case 
studies that he researched revealed that “short timelines help stabilize requirements, 
technology, budget and people. Short timelines also foster accountability, ownership 
and learning. To keep timelines short, projects must exercise restraint over budgets, 
complexity and size. Increases to the project’s budget complexity or size inevitably 
reduce its speed.” (Ward, 2010b)  Table 15 shows the eight FIST Practices that are 
necessary to implement the FIST framework. These practices must be done on a 
continuous basis for the FIST approach to be effective, a process that is identified in 
Principles 2 and 14 of Liker’s “The Toyota Way.”  
Table 15.   FIST Practices (From Ward, 2010a) 
 
Although Ward coined this FIST phraseology in the early 2000s, the FIST 
practices have been in existence and used in space acquisitions since the 1950s.  For 
example, the initial DMSP Block I program would qualify as a FIST project because its 
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literature search revealed strong “value clues” for all four FIST elements (i.e., Fast, 
Inexpensive, Simple, and Tiny), leading to an overall high FIST score.  “Value clues” are 
statements of priorities and preferences that indicate the presence of the FIST values. 
Specifically, the program was FIST Fast, in fact, extremely fast by today’s standards. In 
1961 Lt. Col Haig had 22 months to design, develop, build, test, and deliver four Weather 
satellites with the first satellite ready for launch in only 10 months from the onset of 
funding (FIST Fast). Based on the strong explicit affirmation of the importance of speed 
in this value clue and using the FIST Rubric in appendix A of Ward’s 2009 thesis, a high 
“F- score” of 10 is appropriate for this FIST element.   
It was also FIST Inexpensive. The program of four satellites was developed on a 
“small fixed budget” (Hall, 2001). To ensure that it remained inexpensive, then Lt Col 
Haig dictated the  
use of fixed price, fixed delivery contracts under his direct control throughout the 
program. Evans [then Deputy Director of the Office of the Secretary of the Air 
Force for Special Projects and the person who appointed Lt Col Haig to be the 
first DMSP director] added a ‘kill switch’ of his own: if the first launch could not 
be met on schedule or if cost appeared certain to exceed the fixed budget, he 
instructed Haig to terminate the program and recover government funds 
immediately without further direction. (Hall, 2001) 
These precautions proved invaluable for the program’s success.  
The RCA fixed-price, fixed delivery contract proved itself in December 1961 
when a major structural member of the weather satellite, the base plate, failed 
during tests and company officials requested a three month delay for redesign. 
Croft [the officer responsible for overseeing contract management], after 
discussion with Haig, advised RCA that it had ten days to produce a fix or the 
contract would be terminated under procurement regulations ‘at no cost to the 
government.’  The RCA program manager appeared three days later with revised 
internal schedules that met the original launch date. (Hall, 2001)  
 These actions showed their commitment to ensuring that the program’s costs 
remained inexpensive. Based on the strong, explicit affirmation of the importance of low 
cost and selective contract type used to prevent overruns, the FIST Rubric would assign a 
high “I-score” of 10 for the Inexpensive FIST element. 
The program was FIST Simple, in comparison to the requirements of the current 
DMSP constellation and the number of sensors currently being flown. The requirements 
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were for “a ‘minimum’ proposal for four ‘Earth-referenced’ wheel-mode weather 
satellites to be launched on NASA Scout boosters” (Hall, 2001). The satellite mission 
was to enable “accurate and timely meteorological forecasts of the Sino-Soviet landmass. 
Such forecasts would make possible cloud-free photography over areas of interest” (Hall, 
2001). To ensure that the system remained simple, then Lt Col Haig, “meteorologist and 
electrical engineer, accepted the assignment on condition that he would not have to use 
the resident ‘systems engineering and technical direction (SE&TD)’ contractor, [and] 
could select his own small staff….Haig divided the work among those he initially 
elected: three officers and…‘a very busy secretary’” (Hall, 2001). It was “Haig’s view, an 
SE&TD contractor could only justify its existence by introducing changes. Since changes 
involved time and cost money, SE&TD support was incompatible with fixed price, fixed 
delivery contracting” (Hall, 2001). Based on the strong, explicit affirmation of the 
importance of simplicity and deliberate steps taken to actually reduce complexity (no 
SE&TD), the FIST Rubric would assign a high “S-score” of 10 for the Simple FIST 
element. 
Finally, these satellites were FIST Tiny. They were 100 pounds, 23 inches across, 
21 inches high, and hosted one sensor (as shown in Table 4) as compared to current 
DMSP satellites that weigh 2,278 pounds, 24 feet long, and hosts eight sensors (Table 8). 
Apart from the size difference, the value clues found only had moderate, occasional 
affirmation of the importance of being small. This finding corresponds to a medium “T-
score” of 5 for the Tiny FIST element.    
Based on the fact that “Haig’s ‘blue suit’ program team met its ten-month 
schedule….[that the] program now possessed the first U.S. military satellite to be 
commanded and operated on orbit on a daily basis over an extended period of time”  
(Hall, 2001), the program would, according to the FIST Rubric (see Appendix B), obtain 
an “Outcome score” of A. The overall Rubric score of 35 (sum of the F, I, S, and T 
scores) is considered to be high because the scale ranges from -20 to 40 and hence the 
DMSP Block I program would be classified as a FIST project. 
The FIST principles shown in Table 16 can be considered as FIST Heuristics 
because they are not rigid rules but rather general principles to be used as suggestions.  
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Table 16.   FIST Principles (From Ward, 2010a) 
 
Several of these principles and heuristics were shown in the previous DMSP 
Block I example and serves as a guide to Systems Engineers and Program Managers. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE EASE PROCESS TO SPACE ACQUISITIONS 
In June of last year, and as part of the Secretary of Defense’s Efficiencies 
Initiative, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics began an effort to restore affordability and productivity in defense 
spending. Major thrusts of this effort include targeting affordability and 
controlling cost growth, incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry, 
promoting real competition, improving tradecraft in services acquisition, and 
reducing nonproductive processes and bureaucracy. As part of this effort, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force are proposing a new 
acquisition strategy for procuring satellites, called the Evolutionary Acquisition 
for Space Efficiency (EASE), to be implemented starting in fiscal year 2012. 
(GAO, 2011, May) 
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Before delving into the application of the EASE process to space acquisitions, 
Figures 19 through 22 shows how the Air Force views its current challenges with space 
acquisitions and hence its reason for developing EASE to help alleviate these challenges. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Plot of Percentage Schedule versus Cost Growth (From Hyten, 2011) 
 71 
 
Figure 20.   Cost Comparison of Space Programs against Non-Space Programs  
(From Hyten, 2011) 
Figure 21.   Consequences of Changing Platforms (From Hyten, 2011) 
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Figure 22.   Space System Challenges and Consequences (From Hyten, 2011) 
EASE is made up of four basic tenets: block satellite buys, established stable 
research and development investments, fixed price contracting, and ensured full finding 
over multiple years through advanced appropriations. (Tobias, 2011)  The premise is, 
with block satellite buys, DoD can capitalize on “economy of scales” and procure critical 
parts, especially because most component parts are used in batches, to build subsystems 
and systems. Block buys will enable production lines to be run more efficiently while 
reducing non-recurring engineering costs. Next, by establishing stable research and 
development investments result in efficiencies being achieved because this re-investment 
leads to downstream performance increase and lower system cost for follow-on systems. 
Those dollars are used to fund technological improvements via a Capability and 
Affordability Insertion Program (CAIP). This process will essentially lower the costs for 
follow-on systems while improving their quality. The next tenet of EASE is to use fixed 
priced contracting. Those programs most affected are in the post development phase, 
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where the bulk of the acquisition dollars are spent. In these post development phase 
acquisitions, many uncertainties should have been worked out of the systems, 
requirements should be approved and inviolable to minimize risk for the contractor. 
Lastly, the commitment for full funding is needed through multiple fiscal years using 
advanced appropriations to spread the cost over several years. Multi-year appropriations 
help provide the funding stability that nearly all programs lack (Tobias, 2011). So 
essentially, three types of funding are needed: advanced procurement, procurement, and 
advanced appropriation dollars. For the EASE process to work efficiently all aspects of 
funding, program management, and systems engineering must be executed in the manner 
they were intended and at the right time. This is similar to the FIST approach.  “EASE is 
intended to help stabilize funding, staffing, and subtier suppliers; help ensure mission 
continuity; reduce the impacts associated with obsolescence and production breaks; and 
increase long-term affordability with cost savings of over 10 percent” (GAO, 2011, May) 
The initial DMSP Block I program met at least three of the four basic EASE 
tenets. It was a block buy of four satellites; used a fixed price, fixed delivery contract that 
proved itself; and had a small fixed budget for its 22 month schedule that appeared to 
have been fully funded. The second tenant, i.e., stable research and development 
investments, may or may not have occurred at that time, based on being implemented at 
the beginning of the space technology development era. Whether this tenant was satisfied 
is undetermined, as sufficient information does not exist to make that determination. 
However, with clear indications that at least three of the four tenants were satisfied, this 
shows that the initial DMSP Block I program essentially followed the EASE acquisition 
approach.  
The DoD’s plan for first official use of EASE is in FY2012 and to test it against 
the buys for AEHF SV 5 and 6, and Space-Based Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) GEO SV 5 
and 6. Using AEHF SV 5 and 6 as examples, Figure 23 shows a comparison of today’s 
model against a block buy approach and illustrates how today’s model does not foster 
cost efficiency. For example, in 2008 when Congress mandated the purchase of AEHF 4, 
the cost to restart the production line was significantly higher versus if they had followed 
an incremental acquisition approach.   
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The first two AEHF spacecraft cost roughly $6.4 billion, which includes non-
recurring engineering work dating back to early this decade. The third spacecraft 
tallies $939 million, and the cost for adding the fourth is about $2 billion…the 
spacecraft’s high price is due to the expense associated with restarting Lockheed 
Martin’s production line. The contract for the third AEHF satellite was drawn up 
four years earlier.  (Aviation Week, 2011) 
Theoretically, the unit cost for SVs 4, 5, and 6 could have been the same amount 
or even less than SV 3 ($939 million) if an evolutionary incremental approach was used 
for AEHF instead of the planned jump to TSAT. Those decisions have cost the tax payers 
significantly because the costs for AEHF 5 and 6 are going to be significantly higher than 
$939 million each, based on the fact that AEHF 4 costs about $2 billion. 
Figure 23.   Comparison of Today’s Acquisition Model against Block Buy Approach  
(From Hyten, 2011) 
Figure 24 shows how exact replica satellites, “Clones,” are currently bought on an 
as-needed basis. It shows the impacts of obsolescence, production breaks, insufficient use 
of labor and small lot material buys that leads to instability in the acquisition process.   
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This causes a domino effect that result in increased unit costs, no increase in capability, 
and exponential increase in Risk, to the point of a potential gap in service. These are all 
unintended consequences of the current space acquisition process.  
Figure 24.   Current Practice of Buying Clones (From Hyten, 2011) 
However, Figure 25 shows what EASE is expected to produce. The capability of 
the satellites are expected to continually increase because newer technology is 
deliberately injected at specific intervals, once matured and proven under Capability and 
Affordability Insertion Programs (CAIPs). The elements of CAIPs are shown in Figure 
30. The expectation is to have a controlled 20 percent design change (thus 80 percent 
common design remains) from one increment to the next, an increase from 10 percent 
which was only as a result of obsolescence issues. The additional 10 percent design 
change is a result of the CAIP program which accounts for the continual capability 
increase, instead of remaining constant as in the case in Figure 24. Buying two satellites 
at a time would also ensure there would be no break in production for the building of the 
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two satellites as there are thought of as a block, with purchases, resources, and budget 
assured for both satellites. Because of the constant interjection of new technologies at 
suitable moments, the obsolescence Risk remains constant instead of growing 
exponentially as in the case of buying clones. This model is predicated on steadier 
funding being available. 
Figure 25.   EASE Expected Results for AEHF Program (From Hyten, 2011)  
Figure 26 shows a side by side comparison of the potential implementation of 
EASE on both the AEHF and SBIRS programs. The requirements baselines would be 
those of AEHF 4 and SBIRS GEO 4 and starting the block buy of two satellites each 
using Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) contracts. At the same time of the block buy, 
several activities under CAIP would begin so as to start the parallel technology 
development and maturation so that it can be interjected at later opportune times. 
Similarly, the Architecture for future blocks would have to be done in parallel so as to 
steer the program in the direction that the government intends to take it. 
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Figure 26.   Comparison of EASE for AEHF and SBIRS (From Hyten, 2011) 
Based on the controlled nature of the EASE initiative, the amount of funding that 
is needed per year to execute the acquisition program is distributed evenly. Figure 27 
shows the level funding amounts that the Air Force requested in the FY 12 President 
Budget as needed to execute the AEHF program based on using the EASE approach. It is 
important to highlight the relatively stable funding that was requested across the fiscal 
years compared against the untenable spikes that were shown in Figure 23.    
A comparison of Pre and Post EASE funding requirements revealed 
approximately $900M of efficiencies that are expected to be gained and would be 




Figure 27.   EASE Funding Profile for AEHF (From Hyten, 2011) 
 
Figure 28.   Comparison of Pre & Post EASE AEHF Funding  (From Hyten, 2011) 
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Figure 29 shows the various option paths based on the CAIP. The Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE) would make the decision on which path to choose, based 
on the CAIP activities, taking into account factors such as maturity of technology at the 
time. For the EASE approach to effectively work, the CAIP activities must be sufficiently 
funded so as to buy down technological risks to the programs, thereby giving the DAE 
more options to choose from at the opportune moment.     
 
 
Figure 29.   Roadmap for CAIP (From Hyten, 2011) 
The four elements of the various CAIP programs that are available to be utilized 
are shown in Figure 30. Each of these elements share several similarities with the 
14 Toyota Way Principles identified in Chapter II. Figure 31 shows a summary of 
EASE’s challenges and opportunities and how they intersect. Successful execution of 




Figure 30.   CAIP Options (From Hyten, 2011) 
 
Figure 31.   EASE Challenges and Opportunities (From Hyten, 2011) 
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D. APPLICATION OF THE TOYOTA WAY PRINCIPLES TO SPACE 
ACQUISITIONS 
To better understand the relations between the Toyota Way principles and space 
acquisitions, a comparison of each of the 14 principles to space development/ 
manufacturing is required, as seen in Tables 17 through 19. 
Table 17.   Comparison of the Toyota Way Principles 1 through 5 to Space Acquisitions 
The Toyota Way 
Principles 
Similarities and Relation to Space Program Activities 
Principle 1. Base your 
management decisions 
on a long-term 
philosophy, even at the 
expense of short-term 
financial goals.  
This principle is very similar to the philosophy used in Space 
Acquisitions, such as the planning that occurs up front for the entire 
life cycle for the system, i.e., from Cradle to Grave. If done 
properly, in the end, the total ownership cost should be less for new 
satellite systems. It is crucial to get it right for space systems 
because there is not a lot that can be done to change the systems 
once they are launched into orbit. 
Principle 2. Create 
continuous process flow 
to bring problems to the 
surface 
This principle is also done in Space Acquisitions. Events such as 
Lean, Six Sigma, Total Quality Management, and Air Force Smart 
Operations for the 21st Century are some of the processes that are 
used to bring problems to the surface.   
Principle 3. Use “pull” 
systems to avoid 
overproduction.  
Currently, overproduction for new systems is not a problem in 
space acquisitions, in fact, it may be the contrary. However, it could 
be postulated that the current DMSP 5D-3 satellite block was in an 
overproduction situation because satellites still to be launched (F-
19 & F-20) were produced nearly 20 years ago. Conversely, by 
having these two satellites available to launch has given DoD 
flexibility before its first satellite is needed in light of NPOESS & 
DWSS cancellation.  
Principle 4. Level out 
the workload (heijunka). 
(Work like the tortoise, 
not the hare.) 
Historically Space Acquisitions have struggled with this principle, 
having problems with finding the balance. For example, instead of 
building several satellites in blocks and put them in storage such as 
what DMSP has done, which resulted in a break in production line 
and numerous other unintended consequences, an approach that 
enables a slower but constant production line to produce satellites 
when needed is recommended. Such approach will prevent 
situations such as spending several millions of dollars on service 
life extension programs on satellites yet to be launched because of 
issues such as parts obsolescence and degradation issues. 
Principle 5. Build a 
culture of stopping to fix 
problems, to get quality 
right the first time. 
Currently, this is not considered to be a problem in space 
acquisitions because many of the systems are considered to be 
over-engineered because of the concern that once launched, they 
cannot be recovered for major repairs and only the possibility of 
software uploads to fix certain problems. 
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Table 18.   Comparison of the Toyota Way Principles 6 through 12 to Space Acquisitions  
The Toyota Way 
Principles 
Similarities and Relation to Space Program Activities 
Principle 6. Standardize 





The goal of trying to keep satellite production lines ongoing 
enables the standardization of tasks, instead of starting and stopping 
production lines for each satellite or block of satellites, which is 
very costly as illustrated with the cost increase from AEHF 3 to 4 
of $939 million to $2 billion. Additionally, standardizing satellite 
builds is recommended in Chapter V as an area for further space 
acquisitions research. 
Principle 7. Use visual 
control so no problems 
are hidden 
This principle is applicable to the reporting chain for how 
information gets reported to leadership about the status of the 
acquisition. It can be applicable to production lines for both 
automobiles and satellites. 
Principle 8. Use only 
reliable, thoroughly 
tested technology that 
serves your people and 
processes. 
In general, space acquisitions have had problems with complying 
with this principle. This has been evident with several programs, 
such as NPOESS, that takes immature technology into the system 
acquisition and not able to solve problems timely. This principle is 
similar to the 6th FIST Practice in Table 15 “Designs must only 
include mature technologies” and the 2nd EASE Tenet “establish 
stable research and development investments” and will be a 
recommendation of this thesis. 
Principle 9. Grow 
leaders who thoroughly 
understand the work, 
live the philosophy, and 
teach it to others.  
While this thesis focused less on the personnel aspect of programs, 
this principle is very applicable to space acquisitions as 
demonstrated in Table 3 that shows Workforce improvement 
initiatives are part of the Air Force’s acquisition improvement plan.  
Principle 10. Develop 
exceptional people and 
teams who follow your 
company’s philosophy.  
While this principle is generally done in space programs there is 
much room for improvement especially as policies change for how 
systems are to be acquired. 
Principle 11. Respect 
your extended network 
of partners and suppliers 
by challenging them and 
helping them improve. 
This principle is related to space programs because space programs 
have an extended network of system prime contractors, 
subcontractors, and parts manufacturers, similar to the automotive 
industry.   
Principle 12. Go and see 
for yourself to 
thoroughly understand 
the situation (genchi 
genbutsu) 
This principle can be applied to any number of space acquisition 








Table 19.   Comparison of the Toyota Way Principles 13 and 14 to Space Acquisitions 
The Toyota Way 
Principles 
Similarities and Relation to Space Program Activities 
Principle 13. Make 
decisions slowly by 
consensus, thoroughly 
considering all options, 
implement decisions 
rapidly. 
While this principle is great in theory, in practice it is difficult to 
implement on space programs because there are several 
stakeholders and virtually impossible to get consensus by all. This 
was one of the major down falls of the NPOESS program. 
However, Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in space acquisitions 
would benefit greatly from this principle. 
Principle 14. Become a 
learning organization 
through relentless 
reflection (hansei) and 
continuous improvement 
(kaizen) 
Similar to Principle 2, this principle shares similarity with space 
program activities, for example, methods such as Lean, Six Sigma, 
Total Quality Management, and Air Force Smart Operations for the 
21st Century that focus on continuous improvements are used in 
Space acquisitions. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter began with the examination of two new acquisition methodologies, 
FIST and EASE, their application to space acquisitions and how they can help improve it. 
FIST is a values based approach that gives program managers a “tool kit” of eight 
Practices and eleven Principles as guidance to use for making decisions. The original 
DMSP Block I program was used as an example of how to apply FIST to a space 
acquisition program and simultaneously proving that it qualified as a FIST program by 
performing a Rubric score calculation.  
EASE is a new initiative developed by the DoD specifically for Satellite 
procurements. Its four basic tenets: block satellite buys, establish stable research and 
development investments, fixed price contracting, and ensure full finding over multiple 
years through advanced appropriations, were examined. The DMSP Block I program, 
AEHF, and SBIRS GEO were used to demonstrate the application of the EASE process 
to space acquisitions and the potential benefits that the taxpayer can expect to see from 
such an approach. These benefits include reduced obsolescence issues, lower overall 
program costs, capability continually increasing as time passes, and less risky programs.   
This chapter concluded with a mapping of the 14 Toyota Way principles to space 
acquisition, showing the similarities and relations to space program activities. In 
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particular, ten of the fourteen Toyota Way Principles (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14), 
show direct relevance and similarity to space acquisitions, as seen in Tables 17 through 
19, and will be compared to the FIST and EASE principles in Chapter IV.    
In Chapters IV and V, these three tools will be used to help define what a possible 
solution for what the DoD’s follow-on Weather program could be. 
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IV. DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the three approaches: FIST, EASE, and the 14 Toyota Way Principles as 
discussed in Chapter III, this chapter begins with a mapping between them that serves to 
show a comparison and the connections of their applicable aspects to space systems 
acquisitions. These connections will be used later in this chapter to help make 
recommendations for what should be done for a follow-on Weather Satellite program. 
However, before any recommendations are made, a summary of the initial and current 
plans for the program needs to be accomplished. Several findings for the follow-on 
program are highlighted and discussed in this chapter and were based on information 
from the previous chapters.  
B. COMPARISON AND CONNECTIONS AMONG FIST, EASE, AND 
TOYOTA WAY PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO DEFINING NEW 
SPACE SYSTEMS 
As should be expected, FIST and EASE are very applicable to space systems 
acquisitions because they were both developed by analyzing years of DoD systems 
acquisitions with the goal to improve it. However, at least ten of the fourteen Toyota Way 
Principles can also be applied to DoD space systems although their development was 
based on non-DoD acquisitions, i.e., Toyota’s automotive industry way. These 
comparisons are shown in Table 20 by way of mapping related elements to each other. As 
seen in Table 20, there are several similarities and related connections among them. 
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Table 20.   Comparison and Connections Among FIST, EASE, and Toyota Way Principles 
FIST (Fast, Inexpensive, 
Simple, & Tiny) 
EASE Applicable Toyota Way Principle 
1. Minimize team size, 
maximize team talent. 
1. Block Satellite 
buys with 
incremental 
changes in next 
block – capitalize 
on economy of 
scales, buy in 
batches, efficiency 
gained because of 
buying in bulk, 
reduce NRE costs 
 
#1. Base management decisions on 
long-term philosophy, even at 
expense of short-term goals. 
2. Use schedules & budgets 
to constrain the design. 
#2. Create continuous process flow 
to bring problems to the surface. 
3. Insist on simplicity in 
organizations, processes & 
technologies. 
#3. Use “pull” systems to avoid 
overproduction.  
4. Incentivize and reward 
under-runs. 
2. Establish stable 
research & 
development 
investments – fund 
CAIPs, lower costs 
for follow-on 
system 
#4. Level out the workload 
5. Requirements must be 
achievable within short time 
horizons. 
#6. Standardize tasks are the 
foundation for continuous 
improvement & employee 
empowerment 
6. Designs must only include 
mature technologies. 
#8. Use only reliable, thoroughly 
tested technology that servers your 
people and process 
7. Documents & meetings 
must be short. Have as many 
as necessary, as few as 
possible.  
3. Fixed price 




#9. Grow leaders who thoroughly 
understand the work, live the 
philosophy, & teach it to others. 
8. Delivering useful 
capabilities is the only 
measure of success. 
#11. Respect your extended 
network of partners and suppliers 
by challenging them & helping 
them improve. 
9. Fixed funding & floating 
requirements are better than 
fixed requirements and & 
floating funding. 
#13. Make decisions slowly by 
consensus, thoroughly considering 
all options, implement decision 
rapidly. 
10. Complexity is a cost. 4. Full funding over 
multiple years – use 
advanced 
appropriations to 




#14. Become a learning 
organization through relentless 
reflection & continuous 
improvement 
11. Complexity reduces 
reliability. 
12. Simplicity scales. 
Complexity doesn’t. 
13. Iterative approach, not 
one-shot deal. 
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C. ASSESSMENT OF THE INITIAL STARTING POINT FOR THE 
FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM 
At the time of the September 2011 Senate Appropriations Committee’s 
recommendations for termination of the DWSS program, two of three major aspects to 
the follow-on program’s acquisition were known to a certain level of fidelity. 
Specifically, performance and schedule requirements were known as discussed in 
Chapter II. DoD’s performance requirements have now been reduced to providing 
environmental monitoring coverage only in the early-morning polar orbit and with an 
initial launch capability (ILC) no earlier than (NET) 2018. Essentially, DoD needed to be 
prepared to launch one satellite in 2018 to meet its weather requirements which are the 
same observations that were planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites, 
specifically, the VIIRS and Microwave Imager/Sounder (MIS) as shown in Table 11. 
However, with the recent cancellation of DWSS, a 2018 ILC is no longer feasible 
because as seen in Figure 6 from comparable programs, history has shown that it takes 
more than five years before a large scale space acquisition program launches its first 
satellite. The earliest for a recent acquisition program shown in Figure 6 is seven years. 
Also included in Chapter II was the discussion that the Senate Appropriations 
Committee provided $250M in September 2011 for continued senor development, 
requirements definition, and source selection activities for a the competitive source 
selection for the follow-on program. The initial acquisition plan was for the first DWSS 
spacecraft to carry three sensors: Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 
sensor, Microwave Sensor based on legacy requirements, and a Space Environmental 
Monitor (SEM) sensor suite. Similarly, recall that $150M was provided for the current 
NGC contract termination liability and for the government to figure out how much of the 
prior work can be leveraged for the new program.  
The notional program schedule that Mr. John Baldonado presented at the 
American Meteorological Society on January 25, 2011 shows DMSP F-19 ILC in early 
FY13 to replace F-17 (Baldonado, 2011). If F-19 is launched in FY 2013 and with a 
reasonable expectation of at least five years of on-orbit performance, that would enable 
the current DMSP program to provide weather coverage until 2018. However, even an 
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optimistic seven year acquisition timeline for a new satellite will not allow meeting the 
2018 NET ILC for the first follow-on program’s satellite. So, the 2018 ILC date will need 
to be changed. With the DoD still having one satellite remaining to be launched, F-20, 
and no longer responsible for the midmorning orbit where it was slated to replace F-18 in 
2014, F-20 now becomes available to bridge the time between F-19’s expected end of life 
and the follow-on program’s ILC. This ILC date realistically should be set to no later 
than 2020, a date derived by looking at the date F-20 was initially built (which was 
around 1998, and would make it over 20 years old by the time it is launched making it a 
high risk for on-orbit failure) and the fact that any number of situations could occur such 
as F-19 premature failure on orbit or F-20 launch or on orbit failure. These timeline are 
depicted in Figure 32. So, F-20 should be kept in a “launch on demand” status to give 
DoD more options should in case any of the aforementioned situations were to occur 
otherwise DoD could end up in a situation that leads to poor or no weather coverage until 
the follow-on program’s first satellite is launched. This situation is a real possibility 
especially because such situation occurred twice in DMSP’s history in 1976 and 1980 
with the failures of DMSP Block 5C-3’s F-34 satellite and DMSP Block 5D-2’s F-5 
satellite. Both satellites were the last in their respective block and series (as would be the 
case for F-20), and their launch failures led to poor and no military weather coverage 





Figure 32.   Recommended Launch dates until Follow-on Program’s 1st Launch 
D. FIST, EASE, AND THE TOYOTA WAY APPLIED TO DMSP FOLLOW-
ON PROGRAM 
Below, the four elements of FIST, in conjunction with its practices and principles, 
simultaneously with the four tenets of EASE and 16 Principles of The Toyota Way, as 
F-19 launch 
2013 2018 2020 
F-20 launch Follow-on program’s 1st launch 
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discussed in Chapter III, are used to define a series of steps that the program office for the 
DMSP follow-on system should undertake to develop an executable program that meets 
its cost, schedule, and performance requirements. The tenets of EASE and applicable 
Toyota Way principles are incorporated into the discussions under the appropriate FIST 
elements below to justify the finding.   
1. First FIST Element: Fast 
Decisions made for the new program should embrace commitment to speed, not 
just program schedule but also with timely decision making. With the 2012 order to stop 
work on the DWSS program, time is of the essence for the program office to figure out 
what can be salvaged from both the original NPOESS and initial DWSS programs and 
develop an executable plan that puts the new program on a path to success. It is vital that 
all stakeholders are part of the decision making process and agree with the recommended 
path forward. With the DoD relying on aging on-orbit satellites and two satellites yet to 
be launched that will be approximately 15 and 20 years old, respectively, by the time they 
are launched, schedule is paramount and emphasis should be placed on it and reflected in 
every decision that is made. As the 13th Toyota Way principle states, “Make decisions 
slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; implement decisions rapidly.”  
While seven years may appear to be sufficient time to acquire a satellite, history has 
shown that none of the current major space acquisition programs have been able to meet 
this timeline, as shown in Figure 6. So, the program office should consider this schedule a 
high risk and implement decisions rapidly. One way to achieve a fast schedule is to 
ensure that mature technologies are utilized, which is the eighth principle of The Toyota 
Way, “use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and 
process.”      
2. Second FIST Element: Inexpensive  
To ensure that the follow-on program remains affordable, realistic requirements 
have to be generated to prevent a similar situation of over promising and under delivering 
that has occurred on nearly every recent space program as shown in Figure 5. A key issue 
focuses on what the true requirements for the follow-on program are: not just accepting 
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the legendary NPOESS Initial Operational Requirements Document (IORD)–II as the 
definitive set of requirements because it contained both DoD and DoC requirements. So, 
it is imperative to ensure that only the DoD’s requirements are extracted and drive the 
new acquisition, because, DoC is now responsible for their own requirements and 
acquisition. There are numerous ways to achieve inexpensive solutions. One way is to 
start from a proven baseline, such as the legacy DMSP Block 5D-3 satellites, particularly 
F19 and F20 satellites that underwent slight modernization. So, the DMSP System 
Operational Requirements Document (SORD) would be a recommended starting point 
for a requirements document.  
To ensure the acquisition program remains inexpensive, “buy in bulk” and buy 
utilizing contracts such as FPIF that incentivize adherence to cost and ensure that there is 
sufficient funding to pay for the entire block buy. This step of ensuring an inexpensive 
“buy” incorporates the first, third, and fourth basic tenets of EASE (Block satellite buys, 
fixed priced contracting, and ensuring full funding). The Block buy should be for only 
two satellites at a time, due to the reduced DoD requirement to fly in one orbit. If the 
requirement was to revert to the two orbits as currently flown, then the block buy should 
be for four satellites, similar to the aforementioned proposed AEHF EASE approach 
(Chapter III, Figure 26). The goal is to get a production line started that is sustainable, 
very similar to the GPS or Toyota production line philosophy (Chapters II and III). While 
this production line would contain only two satellites in production at any given time and 
being built at a much slower pace, as compared to the automotive industry, the principles 
remains the same – do not fall into the trap of customizing every satellite that is built, but 
instead standardize the satellites to fit the production line and processes. The findings in 
this paragraph are in line with The Toyota Way Principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8, which are 
“base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of 
short-term financial goals, continuous process flow, use the “pull” system to avoid 
overproduction, level out the workload, standardize tasks and processes, use only 
reliable, and thoroughly tested technology,” respectively. 
While the norm is for the government to use Cost contracts to acquire the first two 
satellites in most new acquisitions, in this case, the use of FPIF contracts should be the 
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preferred approach because of a number of reasons unique to this acquisitions such as the 
more matured program requirements (resulting from the recommendation to scale back to 
legacy DMSP requirements), while leveraging the billions of dollars that have been spent 
on developing newer technologies for NPOESS. Therefore, the requirements and 
technologies should be mature for both spacecrafts and sensors. A compelling reason 
would be needed to justify why an FPIF contract could not be used, especially since it 
was the contract vehicle effectively used in the initial DMSP Block I acquisitions in 
1961, a period which did not have existing technology to leverage, in contrast to what 
currently exists today. Another reason why an FPIF contract is recommended for the 
spacecraft procurement is because several spacecrafts on the market are commercially 
available or have already been modified for usage in another DoD programs. The 
requirements for the spacecraft should be readily identifiable because, as shown in 
Chapter II, DoD has flown 42 DMSP satellites during the past 50 years in the same 
orbits. So orbit unique requirements such as additional onboard power storage are known. 
With the information known today from legacy weather sensors and modernized 
ones from those on NPP or others currently in industry, the program office should be able 
to define the Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) required for each sensor and generate 
clearly defined interface requirements for the spacecraft. Knowing this fidelity with the 
sensors requirements also compliments the use of FPIF contracts for sensor procurement. 
While sensor integration is normally done via a cost contract, a separate FPIF contract for 
sensor integration is also advocated and recommended that it is awarded to the prime 
contractor for the spacecraft and not the senor vendor(s) or a third integration contractor. 
The reason for this recommendation is because it will reduce complexity by not having a 
third contractor involved. The incentive should be written at a high level so as to give the 
government the flexibility needed and reduce contract modifications. For these reasons, 
the use of FPIF contracts to incentivize contractors to meet DoD’s needs such as cost 
efficiency is recommended. The use of fixed price contracting to the maximum extent 
will enable the program to meet the inexpensive element of FIST and coincides with the 
third element of EASE.  
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Finally, it is imperative to ensure there is full funding for each block of two 
satellites that are to be procured. That is the only way to provide assured skills, resources, 
and lower costs. Delays in funding will result in corresponding delays to the program 
meeting its goals. This finding is the same as the fourth element of EASE.  
3. Third FIST Element: Simple 
To meet the first two FIST elements, it is imperative to keep the program simple 
and set realistic goals. As mentioned in the second element, the requirements should be 
based on the proven technology, such as the legacy DMSP Block 5D-3 spacecraft 
requirements, specifically those of the updated F19/F20 satellites. Although some aspects 
of these satellites may be obsolete, there are other aspects not obsolete, such as how the 
sensors and subsystem of the spacecraft integrate and work efficiently. In addition, 
information should be rapidly gained from NPP which was recently launched and which 
is based on modern technology. The DMSP follow-on program manager needs to ensure 
that there is no delay in the first 2 satellites builds because of the desire to mature 
technology that is not yet proven. So, every effort should be made to leverage proven 
technology that has been developed and proven on NPP and the NPOESS program. Any 
unproven technology needs to be deferred for implementation on the third and subsequent 
SVs, once they are proven; so essentially an incremental approach to acquisitions. This 
technology maturation would be part of a CAIP for the DMSP follow-on program as 
defined in Figure 26. The previous findings are consistent with EASE’s second tenet of 
“establishing stable research and development” and Principle 8 of The Toyota Way “Use 
only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and processes.”  The 
goal is to get away from trying to acquire the “next best thing,” which should be left to 
the research labs and developmental planning organizations to first be thoroughly proven 
before moving such technology to the program offices where operational system 
acquisitions occur.           
In keeping with the “Simple” element of FIST, the program office should verify 
that three initial sensors per satellite (VIIRS, SEM-N, Microwave Sensor with legacy 
DMSP performance or greater) are absolutely needed to be on the first two satellites. 
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Since the VIIRS sensor is built and proven, DoD should sole source an FFIP contract to 
the sensor vendor, for 2 units, with a requirement that by buying 2 units, the cost of the 
second unit will be considerably less expensive than the first, otherwise do a competitive 
source selection. Similar processes should be followed for the other two sensors. Each of 
the sensors should be prioritized, classifying them as either primary, secondary, and/or 
tertiary. Based on their priority, the program office should set strict rules for how any of 
their cost, schedule, and/or performance impacts will affect the overall program. For 
example, in the event that an issue develop with a lower priority sensor, the course of 
action is clear if that sensor will be flown on the particular spacecraft that it was initially 
planned for or if instead it will be flown on the next spacecraft. To keep a program 
simple, at times, tough decisions like these have to be made. As principle 13 of the 
Toyota way states, “make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all 
options; implement decisions rapidly.”    
The program office should leverage as much of the common ground system 
architecture that is currently being used for the DMSP operational satellites via NOAA’s 
Satellite Operations Facility (NSOF), instead of looking to acquire their own command 
and control facilities to support its new satellites. As the ground system ages, an 
incremental modernization approach, in conjunction with NOAA should be undertaken.  
4. Fourth FIST Element: Tiny  
For the FIST and EASE models to be effective in lowering costs and improving 
scheduled deliveries, acquired systems need to adhere to the model and be optimally 
sized. Prior to the Senate’s recommendation to cancel the DWSS program, the initial 
acquisition plan was for a modified NPOESS C spacecraft that is 40% smaller. Because 
of the high cost to launch satellites, SWaP factors are extremely important and are 
constantly being traded-off in space acquisitions. Therefore, an assessment needs to be 
conducted into the use of a smaller spacecraft, even smaller than the current Block 5D-3 
spacecraft. Advances in technology have allowed for the reduction in size of several 
electronics and the integration of various piece parts, to produce overall smaller form, fit, 
and functional multipurpose products; for example, a smart phone. As a result, instead of 
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launching on Atlas V or Delta IV rockets as done for the current DMSP satellites, the 
new satellites could potentially be launched on smaller rockets such as the Minotaur IV.   
E CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter began with comparing and showing connections among FIST, EASE 
and Toyota Way principles that are applicable to defining new space systems. Then, an 
assessment of where the DMSP follow-on program currently stands based on the 
September 2011 Senate Appropriations Committee’s recommendations for termination of 
the DWSS program and the subsequent stop work in January 2012. The four elements of 
FIST, along with the four tenets of EASE and 16 Principles of the Toyota Way were 
assessed and shown to be applicable and appropriate for consideration for the DMSP 
follow-on program based on current known information. This assessment resulted in a 
series of findings for the program office to pursue for their new follow-on program.   
The results of this chapter shows that meeting production schedules for a  
2018 ILC is no longer feasible especially because of the recent DWSS cancellation. A 
2020 ILC date was recommended after evaluating launch dates for the two remaining 
satellites taking into account their ages by then, and a seven year acquisition timeline. 
Based on the time it takes to acquire similar systems, a 2020 ILC is optimistic and 
remains a high risk to the program. However, if the program office uses the findings of 
this chapter, the principles of FIST, EASE, and The Toyota Way, and adopt best practices 
from other current programs such as GPS IIIA’s incremental developmental approach as 
discussed in Chapter II, it should be able to meet the new ILC, minimizing the possibility 
of a break in DoD weather coverage and placing the follow-on program on a sustainable 
path for the future.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. CONCLUSION 
The research questions from Chapter I are restated below with concise answers to 
them and references to applicable sections of this thesis that covered them. 
1. What are some of the acquisition challenges facing current Space 
systems?  The high cost of space systems and unstable funding are the two 
greatest challenges currently affecting it. Others include risk aversion, 
introducing immature technology to systems acquisitions, and trying to satisfy 
all requirements in a single step and on fewer platforms that leads to very 
complex systems. These challenges were discussed in Chapter II. 
2. What acquisition approach is best suited for Space systems? Single Step, 
Incremental/Block, Spiral, or a combination?  Based on the research 
conducted in this Thesis (DMSP, GPS, FIST, EASE, Toyota’s approach, etc.), 
a combination approach is best suited. Specifically, a Block approach with 
Spiral increase in capabilities interjected at opportune times within the block 
acquisitions, as intended with the CAIP process within EASE. These reviews 
and applications were covered in Chapters II and III.  
3. What is a possible solution for the new DMSP follow-on program if FIST, 
EASE, and Toyota’s approaches were used to help define it?  A 
Block/spiral combination acquisition approach for two satellites at a time with 
CAIP results interjected between every 2 satellite builds, utilizing fixed price 
incentive contracts where feasible and a 2020 ILC. See Chapter IV, sections C 
and D, for details of the solution. 
4. What lessons, if any, can Space System acquisition leverage from other 
acquisition approaches such as those used in the automotive industry? 
There are several lessons to be learned but ones identified are Principles 1 
through 14 that are shown in Tables 17 through 19. For example, how 
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standardize tasks are the foundation for continuous improvement. See section 
C of this chapter for recommendation for further study on this topic. 
The research conducted in this thesis suggests that if a strong modernization effort 
had occurred in parallel with the acquisition of the current DMSP Block 5D-3 satellites, 
the combination would have resulted in an affordable transition to the next generation of 
weather satellites. For example, if during the years when the first three of the current 
block’s five satellites were being launched and operated, such parallel modernization 
efforts were occurring, there would have been sufficient time to demonstrate the newer 
technology on the final one or two satellites to be launched in this block thereby 
smoothing the “technological hurdle ramp” to the next generation weather satellites. 
Consider it an incremental increase in capability, demonstrated on the current block, for 
implementation on the next block acquisition. If this incremental process was to be 
continuously repeated (as long as the requirements exists for these satellites) there would 
be more of gradual increase in capability and theoretically should result in lower overall 
costs and more compact scheduled deliveries of capability to the warfighter. The key is 
disciplined, concurrent, mature technology insertion occurring during the life of program 
and hence the importance of the CAIP discussed in Chapter III. Basing the acquisitions 
strategy of a future program on the next best technology can delay development and force 
immature technology into production line systems that end up in costly rework and 
disruption of work flow. This gradual continuous improvement cycle is the goal of EASE 
as discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
The three approached described in this thesis pose the same underlying notion that 
greater efficiency is attainable in DoD acquisitions. With limited funding available to 
procure new systems, DoD must be more efficient in the way it acquires satellites. 
Essentially, DoD needs to transition to a system of procurement “on-demand” to meet its 
requirements. Parts degradation and obsolescence makes it costly to block buy several 
satellites at once and then place them in storage for a significant number of years, as in 
the case of the current DMSP 5D-3 block, and it is significantly more costly to buy one 
satellite at a time. So, DoD needs to find the balance between the two approaches. This 
thesis recommends a combined approach, based on the research that was conducted. 
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Specifically, a Block approach with Spiral increase in capabilities interjected at 
opportune times within the block acquisitions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To ensure that the findings presented in Chapter IV remains valid, the DMSP 
follow-on program office should ensure that DoD’s requirement still remains as one 
orbit, and has not changed since DWSS’ cancellation. This is because the acquisition 
approach defined in Chapter IV would require the number of satellites acquired in each 
block be doubled if the requirement was to revert to providing coverage in the two orbits 
that DMSP satellites have flown for over 46 years, since March 18, 1965. Another 
recommendation is to continue the tradition of DMSP program and name this new block 
of satellites Block 6, so as to continue the historical legacy of the DMSP satellites as 
discussed in Chapter II. With current DMSP satellites surpassing on average 60 months 
on orbit and with the current advances in technology, it is reasonable to require at least 
7 years of on-orbit performance for the follow-on program’s satellites. As the EASE 
approach is implemented, DoD should seize the opportunity to standardize the production 
process for spacecrafts and acquire payloads to match standard interfaces with satellites 
and not the opposite where each Satellite is a custom design based on the payload 
characteristics.  
C. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research should be conducted on what it would take for DoD to define 
standard size (e.g., small, medium, and large) satellites and have standard production 
lines for them. In addition, it would be interesting to explore ways for DoD to own  
the production lines and pay industry or research laboratories to interject technology 
when mature, essentially the reverse of the current process. As satellites go through  
these standard production lines, they could be tailored based on their missions  
(e.g., surveillance, communications, meteorology, and navigation) and orbits (e.g., LEO, 
HEO, or GEO) they are slated to fly in. This approach potentially could further lower the 
cost of space system acquisitions while ensuring that the warfighter receive the 
capabilities when needed. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF TERMS  
This thesis contains acronyms for sensors that were not defined. See below for a 
more detailed definition and explanation for each DMSP sensor in the Block 5D series. 
This was courtesy of Bohlson, 2007. In addition, Table 21 contains definitions for the 
sensors that were going to be flown on the NPOESS spacecrafts.  
 
Primary Sensor: OLS - Operational Linescan System 
The OLS measures visible and thermal infrared bands, thus obtaining 
cloud cover and some temperature information. The main portion of the 
OLS is an oscillating telescope device driven in a sinusoidal motion by 
counter-reacting coiled springs and a pulsed motor. The motion moves the 
instantaneous field of view (IFOV) of the detectors across the satellite 
subtract, with maximum scanning velocity at nadir and reversals at the end 
of each scan. Detector size is dynamically changed to reduce angular 
IFOV as it approaches each end of scan, thereby maintaining an 
approximately constant footprint size on earth. The swath width is 2963 
km from the nominal 833 km orbital altitude. New bearings and lubricant 
were incorporated into the OLS beginning with F-12. 
The OLS provides global coverage in both visible (L data) and infrared (T 
data) modes. Fine resolution data with a nominal linear resolution of 0.56 
km are collected as needed, day and night, by the IR detector (TF data), 
and as needed, during daytime only, by a segmented, silicon diode 
detector (LF data). A high resolution photomultiplier tube is used for 
nighttime visible imagery. 
For Block 5D spacecraft, tape recorder storage capacity limited the 
quantity of fine resolution data (LF or TF) which can be down linked from 
the stored data fine (SDF) mode to each ground station readout. Data 
smoothing permits global coverage in both the IR (TS) and visible (LS) 
spectrum to be stored on the tape recorders in the stored data smoothed 
(SDS) mode. Smoothing is accomplished by electrically reducing the 
sensor resolution to 2.78 km in the along scan direction, then digitally 
averaging five such 0.56 x 2.78 km samples in the along track direction. A 
nominal linear resolution of 2.78 km results. An additional detector allows 
collection of visible data (LS) with a 2.78 km nominal linear resolution 
under low light level conditions. These data are used for nighttime cloud 
cover and aurora equator ward boundary determination. The visible 
daytime response of the OLS is from 0.4 to 1.1 microns, chosen to provide 
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maximum contrast between earth, sea, and cloud elements of the image 
field. The visible fine mode is provided for day scenes only. 
The IR detector consists of two segments and is switched along scan to 
provide approximately constant ground footprint and image denotation. 
The detector is tri-metal (HgCdTe), passively cooled, and operates at 
approximately 110°K. The OLS IR spectral response of 10.5 to 12.8 um 
was chosen to optimize detection of both water and ice crystal clouds. The 
dynamic range of the sensor is from 190°K to 310°K with an accuracy of 
1°K NE T from 210°K to 310°K. 
The OLS data processing subsystem performs command, control, data 
manipulation, storage, and management functions for the entire sensor 
suite.  The OLS receives and stores commands from the ground station 
and then processes them according to time codes. The OLS executes 
commands, accomplishes the smoothing of fine resolution data, derives 
gain commands from orbital parameters for normalization of visual data 
and dynamic signal control, and outputs the data to the spacecraft 
communications system. All data are processed, stored, and transmitted in 
digital format. The OLS also provides the data management functions to 
process, record, and output data from up to 12 additional environmental 
sensors. All DMSP transmissions (telemetry monitoring, satellite 
command and control, and sensor data) are encrypted. The encrypted data 
can be output simultaneously with playback of two channels of stored 
data. 
A combination of either fine resolution data and the complementary 
smoothed resolution data (i.e., LF and TS or TF and LS) can be provided 
in the direct digital transmission mode (RTD). For RTD, the size of the 
pixel for the fine data is 0.56 x 0.56 km and 0.56 x 2.78 km for the smooth 
data. The OLS system includes and controls four digital tape recorders and 
each one can record at any one of three data rates and play back at either 
of two data rates. The recorders for spacecraft through S-15 have the 
capacity for storage of at least 400 minutes of SDS (TS and LS) data, or at 
least 40 minutes of SDF (LF or TF) data, or at least 20 minutes of SDF 
(LF and TF) data. For spacecraft S-16 through S-20, added channels will 
decrease these figures (and increase the mission sensor data) to at least 
300 minutes of SDS (TS and LS) data, or at least 30 minutes of SDF (LF 
or TF) data, or at least 20 minutes of SDF (LF and TF) data. All tape 
recorders are interchangeable in function to provide operational 




Mission Sensors - 
 
SSB - Gamma Tracker 
The SSB was supplied by Sandia National Lab and was used to track 
fallout and nuclear debris entrained in the atmosphere above 10 to 15 
kilometers. The sensor detected the fission gammas emitted by the debris. 
SSB/A - X-Ray Spectrometer 
The SSB/A detected x-rays and gammas from bomb debris or those x-rays 
produced by the bremsstrahlung process when electrons precipitate from 
the earth’s radiation belts. By sensing these x-rays, the SSB/A provided 
location of the aurora as it orbits the earth. 
SSB/O - Omnidirectional Gamma Detector 
The SSB/O was an experiment to determine if more accurate atmospheric 
measurements could be obtained by measuring the co-orbiting particles 
and.the upward flux and subtracting it from the sub-satellite scene. The 
experiment was extremely successful. The SSB/O was sensitive to X-rays 
in the energy range of approximately 1.S key. 
SSB/S - Scanning X-Ray Detector 
The SSB/S detected the location, intensity and spectrum of x-rays emitted 
from the earth’s atmosphere. The detector consisted of three sensors. The 
first two each consisted of an array of four 1 cm diameter mercury iodide 
(HgI) crystals collimated to a 10° wide radial field of view. The third was 
a 0.635 cm x 7.62 cm diameter sodium iodide scintillator collimated to a 
10° wide radial field of view. 
SSB/X, SSBIX-M, and SSB/X-2 - Gamma Ray Detectors 
The SSB/X is an array-based system which detects the location, intensity, 
and spectrum of x-rays emitted from the earth’s atmosphere. The array 
consists of four identical and independent directional detectors. The 
SSB/X-M and SSB/X-2 follow from the SSB/X and are also gamma-ray 
and particle detectors. The SSB/X-M and SSB/X-2 consist of two identical 
and independent gamma ray detectors and three particle detectors. The 
SSB/X-M and SSB/X-2 are also capable of detecting gamma ray bursts. 
SSC - Snow Cloud Discriminator 
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The SSC was a 1.6 micron channel instrument. It was used to determine 
the presence of snow versus clouds. It was a proof-of-concept sensor 
intended to help determine if machine processing could make the 
snow/cloud determination. 
SSD - Atmospheric Density Sensor 
The SSD was designed to provide a measure of major atmospheric 
constituents (Nitrogen, Oxygen, and Ozone) in the earth’s thermosphere 
by making earth-limb observations of the ultraviolet radiation from the 
thermosphere. The sensor measured radiation emitted from excitation of 
molecular nitrogen by impinging solar radiation. 
SSE - Temperature Sounder 
The SSE was an eight channel scanning filter radiometer. Six of the 
channels were in the IS um carbon dioxide band, one was in the 12 um 
window, and the last was in the rotational water vapor band near 20 um. 
Radiance measurements of the earth’s atmosphere data were processed to 
obtain vertical temperature profiles. The sensor weighed about 8.2 kg. 
Subsystems included a Chopper Filter Assembly, a Scanner Subsystem, 
and an Electronics Subsystem. In general, the SSE was capable of 
measuring the energy from scenes between O and 330°K, but data were 
usually run between 150 and 330°K. A prototype SSE was flown on F30. 
The sensor was built by Barnes Engineering. 
SSF – Laser Threat Detection 
The SSF is an operational version of the SSZ. It monitors electromagnetic 
radiation. 
SSH - Infrared Spectrometer 
The IR Spectrometer (SSH) was an infrared multispectral sounder for 
humidity, temperature, and ozone measurements. The SSH provided 
soundings of temperature and humidity and a single measurement of 
ozone for vertical and slant paths lying under and to the side of the 
sub-satellite track. 
The SSH made a set of radiance measurements in narrow spectral 
channels lying in the absorption bands of carbon dioxide, water vapor, and 
ozone. The radiance measurements were mathematically inverted to yield 
vertical temperature profiles of temperature, water vapor, and the total 
ozone content. For temperature sounding, radiances were measured in 
narrow channels in the wing of the 15 up Carbon dioxide absorption band. 
For humidity sounding, channels were selected to provide a range of 
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absorption coefficients in the rotational water vapor band. Inversion 
yielded the vertical humidity profile. 
SSH-2 - Infrared Temperature and Moisture Sounder 
The SSH-2 provided soundings of temperature and humidity for vertical 
and slant paths lying under and to the side of the sub-satellite track. It was 
physically identical to the SSH, with different (and tighter) filter bands. 
SSI/E  Topside Ionospheric Plasma Monitor 
The SSI/E measured the ambient electron density and temperatures, the 
ambient ion density, and the average ion temperature and molecular 
weight at the DMSP orbital altitude. The instrument consisted of an 
electron sensor (Langmuir probe) and an ion sensor mounted on a 2.5 
meter boom. The ion sensor is a planar aperture, planar collector sensor 
oriented to face into the spacecraft velocity vector at all times. 
SSI/ES  Ionospheric Plasma Drift/Scintillation Meter 
The SSI/ES is an improved version of the SSI/E. In addition to the 
Langmuir probe and planar collector which make up the SSI/E, the SSI/ES 
has a plasma drift meter and a scintillation meter.  
SSI/ES-2  Special Sensor Ionospheric Plasma Drift/Scintillation Monitor  
The SSI/ES-2 is a package of four sensors that measure in situ ionospheric 
parameters such as ion and electron temperatures, densities, and plasma 
irregularities, as well as ion drift velocity vectors for characterizing the 
high-latitude space environment. The data volume of SSI/ES-2 is 12 
MByte/satellite-day.  
SSI/ES-3 Enhanced Ionospheric Plasma Drift/Scintillation Monitor 
An upgrade of the SSI/ES-2 sensor. The data supports a variety of HF and 
UHF communications missions, and is used for atmospheric drag 
calculations for low Earth orbit satellites. 
SSI/P - Passive Ionosonde 
The SSI/P was a scanning radio receiver. It mapped the man-made radio 
spectrum to determine the critical (breakthrough) frequency of the F-layer 
of the ionosphere. The sensor automatically scanned from 1 MHz to 10 
MHz in 20 KHz steps at a rate of one step per second. 
SSJ - Space Radiation Dosimeter 
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The SSJ. measured the accumulated radiation dose produced by electrons 
in the 1 to 10 MeV energy range, protons of greater than 20 MeV, and the 
effects of the occasional nuclear interactions produced by energetic 
protons. Accumulated dose was measured over a period of time (one year 
minimum). 
SSJ/2 - Precipitating Electron Spectrometer 
The SSJl2 was the next generation SSJ. It consisted of a single stepping 
channel with six energy ranges. Nominally, the channels were 0.30, 0.68, 
1.60, 3.50, 7.90, and 18.00 key. The sampling rate was 0.0922 seconds per 
energy step and the FOV was 30° in an ant,-earth cone. The sensor was 
built by the Aerospace Corporation. 
SSJ/3 Auroral Electron and Ion Spectrometers. 
The SSJ/3 is a next generation sensor of the SSJ. The SSJ/3 was flown on 
all Block 5D-1 spacecraft with the exception of F-1. Objective: 
Measurement of transfer energy, mass, and momentum through the 
magnetosphere-ionosphere in the Earth’s magnetic field. 
SSJ/4  Precipitation Electron/Proton Spectrometer  
The SSJ/4 is a next generation sensor of the SSJ/3. Objective: 
Measurement of transfer energy, mass, and momentum of charged 
particles through the magnetosphere-ionosphere in the Earth’s magnetic 
field. The instrument looks toward the satellite zenith. - The SSJ/4 sensor 
consists of four electrostatic analyzers that record the flux of precipitating 
ions or electrons at 20 fixed energy channels between 30 eV and 30 keV. 
The curved plate detectors allow precipitating electrons and ions to enter 
through an aperture of about 20 x 10 (FWHM). Electrons and ions of the 
selected energy are deflected toward the target by an imposed electric field 
applied across the two plates. The two low energy detectors consist of 10 
channels centered at 34, 49, 71, 101, 150, 218, 320, 460, 670, and 960 eV. 
The high energy detector measures particles in 10 channels centered at 
1.0, 1.4, 2.1, 3.0, 4.4, 6.5, 9.5, 14.0, 20.5 and 29.5 KeV. Each detector 
integrates each channel for 0.09 s from high energy channel to low. A 
complete cycle is sampled each second. The primary sources of the 
particles precipitating into the upper atmosphere are the northern and 
southern auroral zones. The daily data volume is approximately 1 Mbyte 
per satellite. The sensor data also supports missions which require 
knowledge of the polar and high-latitude ionosphere, such as 
communications, surveillance, and detection systems that propagate 
energy off or through the ionosphere. 
SSJ/5 Precipitation Electron/Proton Spectrometer 
Upgrade of SSJ/4. Detects and analyzes electrons and ions that precipitate 
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in the ionosphere to produce an aurora display. The sensor data also 
supports missions which require knowledge of the polar and high-latitude 
ionosphere, such as communications, surveillance, and detection systems 
that propagate energy off or through the ionosphere. 
 
SSK - (Classified Sensor) 
The SSK is a static earth-viewing sensor. It monitors electromagnetic 
radiation. 
SSL - Lightning Detector 
The SSL was a “one-of-a-kind” experiment. It operated at night to detect 
lightning flashes in the 0.4 to 1.1 um range. The peak response was near 
0.8 um. The FOV was 2222 x 2963 km (due to the silicon photodiodes 
arrangement in the sensor). 
SSM  Triaxial Fluxgate Magnetometer 
The SSM measures geomagnetic fluctuations associated with geophysical 
phenomena (i.e., ionospheric currents flowing at high latitudes). In 
combination with the SSI/ES (or SSI/ES-2) and the SSJ/4, the SSM 
provides heating and electron density profiles in the high-latitude 
ionosphere. A new Astromast boom was added on Block 5D-3 to isolate 
the sensor from spacecraft effects. 
SSM/I - Microwave Imager 
The SSM/I is a passive microwave radiometer. It detects thermal energy 
emitted by the earth-atmosphere system in the microwave portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. AFGWC and FNMOC meteorologists and 
oceanographers and certain tactical sites use the SSM/I to measure ocean 
surface wind speed, ice coverage and age, areas and intensity of 
precipitation, cloud water content, and land surface moisture. The data 
obtained are used for tropical storm reconnaissance, ship routing in polar 
regions, agricultural weather, aircraft routing and refueling, estimates of 
trafficability for Army support, communications management, and other 
missions. 
The instrument is a conically scanned imager having a swath width of 
1395 km. The sensor rotates with a nominal 1.9 second period and collects 
data during 102 degrees of each rotation. During the periods of the 
rotation that data are not being collected, the SSM/I collects calibration 
readings from both hot and cold sources. The SSM/I provides seven data 
channels of information. The resolution and the major environmental 
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response of each channel depends upon its wavelength as indicated in 
Table 2.4.3-1. The channels make it possible to judge several 
environmental elements when the channels are processed multispectrally 
using three principles: 
 
SSMIS  Special Sensor Microwave Imager Sounder 
SSMIS = SSM/I + SSM/T-1 + SSM/T-2 (Block 5D-3 sensor). In the Block 
5D-3 satellite era, the Block 5D-2 passive microwave sensor suite is 
combined into a single new sensor package - the SSMIS (see Ref. 3). 
Improvements include 24 channels of data which are all coincident, 
increased resolution range, increased FOV, and enhanced ground 
processing software. The sensor adds one additional channel over the 
SSM/T to improve the measurement of the tropopause temperature and 
height. The frequencies chosen (channels 1-7 and 24) provide near 
uniform coverage in height to about 32 km. With the addition of five more 
channels (channels 19-23), the temperature retrievals are extended up to 
about 80 km. 
The scene spacing for the sounder channels has been improved from 120 
km to 480 km of the earlier instruments to 50 km for the lower atmosphere 
and to 75 km altitude for the upper atmosphere measurements. SSMIS 
uses almost the same channels as SSM/I for the environmental parameter 
extraction. The frequency of 85 GHz was changed to 91 GHz to save an 
extra channel in the system. SSMIS augments the rain retrieval and cloud 
amounts with channel 8 at 150 GHz. 
SSM/T - Temperature Radiometer 
The SSM/T is a seven channel microwave sounder. It measures 
atmospheric emission in the 50 to 60 GHz oxygen (O2) band. The SSM/T 
is designed to provide temperature soundings over previously inaccessible 
cloudy regions and at higher altitudes than those attainable with IR 
sounders such as the SSH and the SSH-2 flown on satellites F-1 through 
F-6. 
 The SSM/T is a cross-track nadir scanning radiometer having FOV of 
14.4°. At the nominal 833 km altitude, the subtrack spatial resolution is an 
approximate circle of 174 km diameter at nadir. There are seven total 
cross-track scan positions separated by 12° with a maximum cross-track 
scan angle of 36°. At the far end of each scan resolution degrades to an 
ellipse of 213 x 304 km size. The SSM/T data swath is about 1500 km; 
therefore, there is a data coverage gap between successive orbits over 
much of the earth. 
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SSM/T-2 - Microwave Water Vapor Profiler 
The SSM/T-2 is a modification of the SSM/T for water vapor sounding. 
This sensor has channels at 91.5 GHz, 150 GHz and the 183 GHz water 
vapor resonance line and has a resolution that ranges between 46 and 120 
km. The system uses the same modular construction as the SSM/T. The 
sensor is packaged separately from the SSM/T to ease integration. 
SSR and IFM (Integrated Flux Monitor) - (Classified Sensors) 
The SSR and IFM were forerunners of the SSZ. 
SSULI  Special Sensor Ultraviolet Limb Imager  
The optical instrument is a spectrograph with the objective to measure 
extreme and far ultraviolet radiation (vertical profiles) from the Earth’s 
limb. The primary observations, ranging from 80 - 170 nm, with 1.5 nm 
resolution, are of radiation from atomic oxygen and nitrogen, and 
molecular nitrogen, resulting in direct measurements of the electron 
density vertical profile as well as ion and neutral densities. The vertical 
profiles in the upper atmosphere and ionosphere are obtained by viewing 
the Earth’s limb at a tangent altitude of approximately 50 km to 750 km. 
The LORAAS (Low Resolution Airglow/Aurora Spectrograph) instrument 
on ARGOS (Launch Feb. 23, 1999) is a SSULI prototype instrument. 
LORAAS data of ARGOS is being used to validate SSULI algorithms that 
convert raw measurements  into useful environmental parameters that 
characterize the upper atmosphere.  
 
SSUSI Special Sensor Ultraviolet Spectrographic Imager  
SSUSI is a nadir-pointing instrument that measures UV radiation from the 
Earth’s atmosphere and ionosphere, it also measures visible radiation 
(airglow and terrestrial albedo). The instrument consists of three 
subassemblies: SIS (Scanning Imaging Spectrometer), NPS 
(Nadir-looking Photometer System), and the support module. SIS in turn 
consists of a cross-track scanning mirror at the input to the telescope 
(folded design) and spectrograph optics. There are redundant 2-D 
photon-counting detectors at the focal plane (detector size: 16 pixels in 
along-track and 160 pixels in the cross-track direction). The detectors 
employ a position sensitive anode to determine the photon event location. 
The scan mirror sweeps the 16 pixel footprint from horizon to horizon, 
producing one frame in 22 seconds. The imaging mode performs 
simultaneous measurements in five wavelength bands from 115 - 180 nm. 
The imaging mode scan cycle consists of a limb-viewing section followed 
by an Earth viewing (nadir) section. Limb-viewing imagery is collected 
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from -72.8º from nadir to -63.2º from nadir. The limb-viewing section has 
a cross-track resolution of 0.4º per pixel, it consists of 24 cross-track 
pixels and 8 along-track pixels (at five bands). The Earth-viewing section 
has a cross-track resolution of 0.8º. - NPS consists of three nadir-looking 
photometers. It operates in the visible portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, monitoring airglow at 427.8nm and 630nm and the terrestrial 
albedo near 630nm. NPS operates only on the nightside of the orbit. Its 
data determine the auroral oval location and provide information to help 
determine electron densities in the F-layer, energy deposition in the 
auroral region (day and night), photoelectrons, neutral composition, and 
equatorial electrojet. Each photometer unit includes an integrated detector 
package consisting of a photomultiplier tube, high voltage power supply, 
and pulse amplitude discriminator electronics.  
SSY - Classified Sensor) 
The SSY is a package of state-of-health sensors. 
SSZ – Laser Threat Detection 
The SSZ is a prototype static earth-viewing sensor. It monitors 
electromagnetic radiation. (Bohlson, 2007) 
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APPENDIX B: FIST RUBRIC 
Table 22.   FIST Rubric (From Ward, 2009) 
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